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Delinquency on the part of Navy contractors plays an
important role in exacerbating the shortage of repair parts
needed to support the fleet. Nearly one quarter of all stock
and in-use item contracts can be classified as delinquent.
SPCC, in its role as a weapons system life cycle manager,
faces a complex, and very real delinquency problem.
The objective of this research effort:, is to explore
those factors associated with the procurement of stock and
in-use items, thai contribute most to the problem of managing
delinquency. Emp.iasis is placed on environmental factors
and the problems of managing a procurement organization as
a public entity. Problem-solving strategies are analyzed
and discussed as are contractual and extra-contractual
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE PROBLEM OVERVIEW
The classic equation that provides the objectives from
which procurement in the Department of Defense (DOD) pro-
ceeds, is comprised of essentially five variables each of
which in its own right has a material effect on the com-
plexion of the desired outcome. Stated in its proper form,
the equation provides that the procurement function should
acquire materials and/or services of the right quality, in
the right quantity, at the right price, from the right source,
and at the right time. In industry, firms are generally
aware of and have the tools to substantially control or moder-
ate the degree of change any one or more of the variables may
encounter over the course of a procurement cycle. In DOD,
however, because of mitigating elements such as Congressionally
imposed direction in the form of law, policy and regulation
established to protect the public interest, socio-economic
considerations, procedural limitations, lack of sufficient
planning, the changing face of national defense and more, the
procurement function finds itself severely limited in its own
ability to control and sometimes to even affect the often
significant degree to which any one of the variables may
deviate from its anticipated norm in promoting the desired
outcome.

Notwithstanding the importance of each variable in the
equation, it is this study's intent to focus on the last
and perhaps the most critical of all the variables . . . at the
right time . This element has two meanings but infers only
one conclusion. We may understand it to mean that the item
in question should be procured at a time sufficient enough to
allow for delivery (production, inspection and shipment con-
sidered) at a predetermined point in time. Conversely we may
understand it to mean simply, that the item in question should
be delivered at the time desired by the consumer. Whichever
viewpoint is chosen, the conclusion is the same, ... "at the
right time" means, the item, allowing for accepted contractor
lead time all fc.ctois considered, should be available to the
consumer at the poirt in time selected by the consumer as
being necessary to the fulfillment of its needs.
Controlling the "fifth variable," that is, ensuring that
the supplies arrive at the designated site on time has proven
to be elusive to managers of many current DOD contracts . It
has been estimated that DOD wide, "one contract in four has
not met its delivery schedule," [Ref. 1] . Further, of those
contracts which have in fact been deemed "late" over eighty
percent were more than ninety days overdue. In a multi-
billion dollar procurement environment subject to often suffo-
cating perusal by Congress and the public at large, an aggregate
failure to deliver or to have delivered, billions of dollars
of goods under contract, opens up a Pandora's Box of point-
counter-point, criticism and review by those who would seek
8

to further constrain the DOD procurement element in its
ability to effectively and efficiently meet its mission
requirements
.
There are many factors associated with the current state
of affairs relevant to the issue of late deliveries. The
changing face of national defense brings with it many unique,
dynamic and often "hard" demands which foster a need for
flexible and creative response. This type of response is
often difficult to obtain because the gamut of tools avail-
able to the procurement community, conceived to provide for
just this type of response, tend to be unwieldy, pacific and
ineffectual because of legal, workload or statutory
considerations
.
It is the purpose of this thesis to explore, discuss and
analyze the problem of late deliveries under DOD contract.
Questions pertaining to why the problem ex:.sts, causal factors,
how the problem is managed, the effects of externalities and
more will be presented and discussed throughout. Focus will
be directed to a particular segment of the DOD procurement
environment in addition to providing primary concentration on
the problem of managing delinquencies.
B. DELINQUENCY DEFINED
Prior to engaging the subject matter herein, it would do
well to make a clear distinction between contracts that are




Contracts experiencing some form of delay are not neces-
sarily delinquent in that the delay may be considered excusable
To be excusable a delay must meet three general requirements
.
First, the delay must arise from unforeseeable causes. The
underlying concern here is that the contractor must have no
knowledge of, nor reason to know of, causes or events con-
tributory to delay, prior to bidding. Second, to be excusable
the event must be beyond the control of the contractor. The
second requirement presumes that the contractor could net
have prevented the occurrence of the event nor could he have
performed in spite of the occurrence. Finally, the delay must
also be without the fault or negligence of the contractor.
Fault or negligence refers to acts or omissions by the con-
tractor which cause delay.
Reasons for excusable delays are legion. The principal
purpose of such are to protect the contractor from sanctions
for late performance. Under the canopy of the excusable
delay the contractor is protected from termination proceedings,
damages (either actual or liquidated) , reprocurement costs
and so on. Examples of delays generally considered to be
excusable are: Acts of God, Weather, Government or Sovereign
Acts, Fire, Freight Embargo and others. Examples of the most
common (Government Acts), would be: data delays, specifica-
tion changes, slow response to requests for waivers and so on.
The Government, subsequent to the delay, generally modifies
the contract to extend the applicable delivery date. Although
10

the required items have been "delayed," they are not
"delinauent .
"
Of course not every fire, or Government Act or freight
embargo is considered an excusable delay. "Whether or not a
delay is viewed as excusable v/ill depend on the language of
the contract in question," [Ref. 2]. In the Department of
Defense (DOD) , the Default Clause, paragraph (c)
,
governs
excusable delays in fixed price supply contracts.
To describe delinquency, Webster uses the phrase "conduct
that is out of accord with accepted behavior or the law,"
[Ref. 3]. Since the law recognizes performance in accordance
with the terms of a contract as a duty, it stands that non-
delivery for which there is no bonafide (accepted) excuse, is
conduct out of accord with the law, hence delinquent:
Subcontractor difficulties, financial problems, lack of
facilities and equipment, lack of materials, poor planning and
so on are examples of causes of delays which are forseeable,
within the contractor's general ability to control and/or are
reflections of some fault or negligence on the part of the
contractor and hence considered non-excusable. Therefore, as
aptly quoted in Administration of Government Contracts , "the
contractor bears the risk of both time and cost for delays
which he causes or which are within his control," [Ref. 4].
DAR (8:25-101.3) defines delinquency as actual failure to
meet delivery schedule or potential failure to meet the




There are many unique considerations attributable to the
various "houses" of procurement within DOD. To avoid con-
flict in consistency in review which may be created by arbi-
trarily combining peculiar procedural or industry practices
under the auspices of a single study of the fifth variable,
it has been determined that a segmentation of the procurement
environment is necessary. This thesis, because of experience
and familiarity, will be primarily concerned with a study of
procurement within the Navy. The Navy procurement environment
may be segmented in many ways, however, the most meaningful
division from the standpoint of procedural, industrial (market)
and environmental peculiarities would be as follows: systems
acquisition (ships, weapons systems, aircraft); commodity
procurement (industrial machinery, services, ADPE) ; and stock
and in-use item procurement (consumables, repair parts)
.
Each procurement segment is, in and of itself, more than
a worthy subject for a comprehensive study of late deliveries.
This study has chosen the area of procurement of stock and
in-use items as its focal point. The logical choice for con-
centration of review and analysis when dealing with any issue
surrounding the procurement of stock and in-use items in the
Navy, and the source selected by this study to be its primary
discussion base, is the Naval Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC)
,
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.
Because of the differences in approach to the management
of "delayed" deliveries as opposed to "delinquent" deliveries
12

(see Introduction; Section B) , the causes, effects, responses
to and critical nature surrounding each, this thesis will
provide primary (although not exclusive) coverage of delin-
quent deliveries. This has been done for two reasons. First,
delinquent deliveries form the bulk (greater than 80%) of the
1
body of late deliveries experienced by SPCC. Second, delin-
quent deliveries are those which are the fault of the prime
contractor and no other. They are, therefore, of greater
import because the tools available to the Government to deal
with them are more "whole" and hence more effective because
of the absence of Government fault. Delays, -o which the
Government is a party either via intent or neglect are more a
matter of coordination, pre-planning and careful administra-
tion and are less clear cut as to responsibility. Consideration
of "delays" will, however, not be absent from this study.
To summarize then, this study will focus primarily on
a review and analysis of the problem of delinquent deliveries
in the procurement of stock and in-use items performed by




This study assumes the reader has a working knowledge of
DOD procurement procedures especially those that relate to
contract administration. No attempt has been made in this
Percentage data obtained via review of DD Forms 1654,
statistical sampling, records review and interviews.
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study to analyze or discuss in detail the various remedies
available, such as Termination for Convenience, Termination
for Default, Changes, Inspection, etc. Where reference is
made to these remedies it will be done in such a way as to
present a point or expand upon some other consideration.
The basics of contract law, responsibilities of the par-
ties, agency law, and the underlying operation of the DOD-
industry procurement interface, are assumed to be understood
by the reader.
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
An extensive review of relevant literature was conducted
to gain a current and historical perspective on the instant
subject. Various sources such as the Naval Postgraduate
School Library, the Defense Logistics Studies Information Ex-
change (DLSIE) , Federal Legal Information through Electronics
(FLITE) system, the Air Force Business Research Management
Center, the Defense Systems Management College, current
textual matter and various other publications both publicly
and privately developed were helpful in the formulation of
perspective
.
To complement and add depth and current personal experi-
ence to the body of printed matter considered, an on site
review and analysis of the procurement function at SPCC, was
performed. This review and analysis included personal inter-
views, records reviews, statistical sampling (informal),




, informal conversations, records flow review and
more. Flexibility was stressed throughout the review period.
Pre-developed, pre-tested review questions were considered
inappropriate for the conduct of personal interviews because
of their tendency to focus the individual on a narrow realm
of consideration and open the floor to personal bias and dis-
tortions based on single subject concentration. Instead, the
interviews were informal, using a broad-stroke approach touch-
ing on many work related subjects moving in and out of con-
sideration of the problem subject to preclude focus. With
more senior management personnel, the questions and conversa-
tions tended toward the more formal and structured.
To contrast and compare data gathered at SPCC with that of
a similar organization outside the public sector, a comparable
on site review was conducted at a major central California
corporation heavily engaged in defense-related business. This
firm was selected because of the scale of its contracts and
the high level of stock and in-use item procurement needed to
support them. The review and analysis conducted on site was
similar in all respects to that accomplished at SPCC, albeit
with less concentration on non-management personnel.
Finally, information thus obtained was analyzed, compared,
contrasted and molded to present a cogent picture of the
existing environment, forces, effects and considerations rele-





Critical to an understanding of the study problem, is
an understanding cf the existing procurement environment.
Chapter II follows the Introduction, with a review of the
current management environment, beginning with an overview,
then focusing on a specific management element. Considera-
tion is also given to the characteristics of work performed
and a summary of how the: environment affects the way manage-
ment responds.
Chapter III discusses the problem itself from many points
of view. Why the problem exists, its elements, scope and
characteristics are all considered in this chapter, as are
managements' concerns and limits. The chapter concludes by
tying in what was learned about the environment in Chapter
II with the insight gained in Chapter III.
An analysis and review of what is being done and what can
or should be done to deal with the problem, is presented in
Chapter IV. The chapter follows a sequential approach from
the earliest (planning) stage to the post-award management
and administration phase allowing for consideration of the
various management techniques required at particular "gates"
in the procurement cycle.
Chapter V presents a personal view, on the part of the
author, as to the sense of proportion that should be exer-
cised when dealing with the problem in general.
The final chapter summarizes conclusions drawn via review
and analysis of all data gathered and presents them as an aid
16

to the reader to provide for a clear understanding of material
presented throughout the study. Recommendations are offered
to management for their consideration in dealing with the
problem.




II. THE MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
In the preceding chapter, the reader was provided with a
very broad overview of the delinquency problem and was briefly
acquainted with some of the considerations associated with
its management. It would be inappropriate to move directly
into an in-depth study of the problem (a task that will be
accomplished in Chapter III) , without first establishing a
point of reference from which to embark.
Everyone would agree that management problems are not
created in a vacuum. They are, in fact, functions of an
environment surrounding some process or structure or the result
of interactive commerce that gives rise to conflicting ideals
or provides for a divergence of pursued goals and objectives.
To understand a particular management problem, in this case,
delinquency, one must first be well grounded in the essentials
of the environment in which it exists. This is the purpose
of Chapter II.
The chapter begins with a detailed examination of the
process—the mission of SPCC . This comprehensive review pro-
vides the reader with an understanding of the duties and
responsibilities of SPCC as an inventory control point. More
importantly, the discussion centers on SPCC * s role as a weapons
system life cycle manager, setting the stage for a later dis-
cussion of why this process is conducive to problem formulation
18

The following section deals with the structure (organization)
of SPCC's Contracting Department. This is important from the
standpoint that organization structure is a reflection of
management's recognition of and response to its environment
(a topic discussed in detail in Chapter III) . Chapter II
concludes with an illustration of the workload faced at SPCC,
in the Contract Management Division. This topic is significant
when considering problem management because it directly affects
the level of resources that can be devoted to problem-solving.
As a consequence, management's strategy will be greatly influ-
enced by the characteristics of the work faced by their per-
sonnel. Elements of this topic will be discussed in subsequent
chapters
.
In summary, Chapter II is a transition chapter designed
to act as a backdrop for the reader's consideration when seek-
ing to gain perspective on the genesis of the delinquency
problem. The chapter also serves to add substance to critical
analysis of the components of the delinquency problem, per-
formed in later chapters.
B. SPCC AS AN INVENTORY CONTROL POINT
SPCC is one of the two major inventory control points
(ICP), in the Navy (the other being the Aviation Supply Office
(ASO) , in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) . The self-proclaimed
goal of SPCC is to "provide cost effective and responsive
supply support to the fleet," [Ref. 5]. To achieve this goal,
SPCC must consistently meet or exceed Department of Defense
19

(DOD) criteria for supply support effectiveness which requires
that 85% of all requests for stock items must be immediately
available from on-hand material. The effect of this policy
on the procurement function is substantial.
SPCC manages an inventory of over 4 50,0 00 line items of
material ranging from ship propulsion equipment and missile
systems to material handling equipment, including the central
management responsibility for conventional ammunition. In
reality, few of the SPCC managed line items are actually
stocked physically at SPCC. Instead, the items are stocked
at Naval Supply Centers (NSC) , Naval Supply Depots (NSD) and
aboard Fleet Stores Ships located close to the fleets.
Through these Navy Supply System stockpoints, SPCC monitors
Navy material transactions world-wide for its own managed
items and directly controls the issue of many critical use
items. Usually, material issues take place at the stock point
closest to the customer. The stock point then reports the
issue to SPCC via a Transaction Item Report (TIR) . There
are times, however, when the stock point cannot meet the re-
quest and the requisition document is passed (normally via a
computer communications network) to SPCC for action. If SPCC
locates the item, the stock point having it will be advised
to forward it to the customer. If, however, SPCC cannot fill
the request, the requirement will either be backordered or
a spot buy will be made. In FY81 , SPCC performed over 39,0 00
20

stock acquisition actions and over 35,000 spot buys. This
process of making material available for issue is, in actuality,
a three-tiered process involving requirements determination,
material procurement and procurement funding, which, in sum,
make up the core of SPCC ' s Supply Operations Group (SOG)
.
"The SOG performs five major functions. For t.he most
part, these functions relate to the deployment/operations phase
of a weapons system life cycle. They are: requirements
determination, material procurement, procurement funding,
material issue and repairables management" [Ref. (>] . Sophis-
ticated computer technology is used to process mul.ti-variable
data including procurement administrative lead time (PALT)
,
risk, holding cost and safety levels, to determine a reorder
level and an economic order quantity (EOQ) for each SPCC
managed item. As noted earlier, TIR's from the fleet supply pro-
vide on-going input data as to what material nas been received
and what has been issued. This information is than auto-
matically compared with actual stocked levels of material and
a computer program designed to monitor the status of each line
item, determines whether or not a buy is necessary, based on
the current stock level and the predetermined reorder level.
This is, in a simplified form, requirements determination,
the result of which is to either buy or repair material to
meet the customers needs
.
Contract statistics, above and in subsequent chapters,
unless otherwise noted, are derived from SPCC Contract Statistics
21

In FY1981, SPCC engaged in over 39,000 stock acquisition
actions at a value in excess of $850 million and a near equal
number of spot buys which totaled over $120 million. These
items were purchased to support a Navy which is rapidly ex-
panding toward the 600 ship mark and which is composed of
vessels as diversified as a Spruance Class Destroyer, which
manages an on-board material inventory of over 30,000 line
items or a Poseidon Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine, managing
over 20,00 items of inventory. To meet its customers needs
from the procurement standpoint, SPCC will engage in routine
stock buys to help ensure they meet anticipated demand and/
or will process spot buys for not carried items and for high
priority requirements for items not in stock (not carried or
not stocked items are abbreviated as NSI while items that
currently are not in stock are shown as NIS) . The majority
of spot buys are for a quantity of, remarkably, one each.
Funding for stock-type procurements comes from the Navy
Stock Fund (NSF) . This is a revolving account consisting of
both money and low cost, consumable type repair parts. The
fund itself is considered revolving because it is replenished
by fleet users who order material carried by (or under) the
stock fund and pay for it out of their assigned operating
funds. SPCC then turns around and replenishes its stocks
with the fleet provided funds. Conversely, fleet commands
need not expend their operating funds for depot level repair-
ables or end-items because SPCC receives Appropriation
22

Purchases Account (APA) funding from the various hardware
systems commands to provide for this type of transaction.
Similarly, fleet commands need not provide their own funding
for the repair of APA material because the hardware commands
provide Operations and Maintenance, Navy (OM&N) funding for
all APA procured material.
From the above described Supply Operations Group functions
(requirements determination, material procurement, and procure-
ment funding) , material is made available for issue to the
fleet. Of the 450,000 SPCC managed line items, approximately
80% are consumable piece parts and the remainder are repair-
ables (APA) material (a repairable is an item that essentially
costs less to repair than it costs to replace, and the over-
all turn around time to reuse is shorter than if it were
reprocured)
.
In conjunction with its supply support operations, SPCC
is also responsible for program support functions, that is,
"deciding who, what, when and how the Navy will provide logis-
tic support to a given weapon system, " [Ref . 7] . The Weapons
System Support Group (WSSG)
,
provides for:
A) Platform Management ... a centralization of responsi-
bility for supply and logistics support for an
entire new construction ship or class of ships in
addition to providing point of contact liaison for
all matters in support of ship construction.
B) Program Management .. .the responsibility for coor-
dinating all efforts to assure support for the
operation and maintenance of a particular equipment.
C) Provisioning. . .determining the range and quantity
of spares and repair parts required to support and
maintain a particular piece of equipment.
23

D) Allowance Documents ... the publishing and distribu-
tion of allowance documents of which the Consoli-
dated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL) , is
probably the most important. The COSAL is used to
identify and obtain repair parts needed for
maintenance of all installed equipment.
In a nutshell then, SPCC, as an organizational entity,
has the all encompassing responsibility of weapons life cycle
management. As a weapons system is born, that is, as it moves
through the conceptual phase to the early developmental/
validation phase, SPCC begins to work with the hardware sys-
tems commands. This is a coordinated, combined management
effort, which weeds through a myriad of economic, technical,
cost, performance and reliability questions to actually
validate the system. If successful and the system moves on
to engineering development, SPCC's WSSG enters the process to
provide coordination and program support and prepare initial
provisioning estimates. While the hardware system commands
are releasing the first production contracts, SPCC is busily
determining inventory management responsibilities and the
range and depth of necessary spare parts support for the system,
along with building necessary computer and technical files
to support the system and preparing and publishing the Allowance
Parts Lists (APL)
.
Finally, when the system is actually delivered and installed
aboard a fleet unit, SPCC's SOG takes over to support it.
The initially provisioned spare parts stocks will last until
actual demand patterns have been established via usage data.
Future material buys will be based on demand and pre-determined
24

reorder levels (requirements determination) . The program
support function and the supply support function now pro-
ceed simultaneously with the inventory manager, SPCC, now
having prime responsibility to support the system in the fleet.
C. CONTRACTING DEPARTMENT RESPONSIBILITIES
The Contracting Department, as noted above, is a func-
tional element of the SOG. As such, the Contracting Depart-
ment is primarily responsible, as the purchasing arm of the
SOG, for processing spot buys to fill NSI and NIS requirements
and for completing stock acquisition actions for the replenish-
ment of stock in the supply system. These two majo:: responsi-
bilities account for over 95% of all Contracting Department
actions (using FY81 data) . Additionally, however, ihe
department is also responsible as the purchasing elament for
the provisioning process, which, again, is the determination
of range and depth of repair parts necessary to support and
maintain a given equipment. The procurement of conventional
ammunition and related material, software contracting for
tenant and related activities, service contracting, contracts
for commercial repair and station support contracts are all
examples of other Contracting Department responsibilities.
SPCC's Contracting Department (Code 2 under the new
organizational scheme, discussed below) , derives its purchasing
authority through the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP)
field purchasing organization. As a contracting activity it
has been granted the highest level of authority possible below
25

the Naval Material (NAVMAT) level, for administrative deter-
minations regarding the procurement process. Current limita-
tions are as follows:
Dollar Authority:
Formally Advertised Awards: unlimited
Negotiated Awards : $2 million
The two basic methods of purchasing, formal advertising
and negotiation, are used at SPCC, which is, of course,
governed by the Defense Acquisition Regulation in its pur-
chasing activities. SPCC receives concurrent guidance from
the Navy Contracting Directives (NCD) , NAVSUP Publication
467 and others. The traditional contractual and pre-contrac-
tual instruments such as the Invitation For Bids (IFB) , the
Request For Proposals (RFP) , delivery orders and Basic Ordering
Agreements (BOA), are used at SPCC. Formal contractual vehi-
cles in use at SPCC are two-party, primarily fixed price,
with incentive and indefinite delivery types also used.
In FY19 81, SPCC completed over 111,000 contract actions,
which included awards both over and under $10,00 0, for a total
value exceeding one billion dollars. The bulk of the actions
(87.5%) were processed in the $1-$10,000 range while the most
dollars were committed through actions with $100-$500, 000
(1,351 actions). As noted earlier, stock acquisition actions
predominate, followed rather closely (39,019 to 35,016) by
In accordance with the Navy Contracting Directives (NCD)
,
negotiated awards over $2 million require NAVSUP approval while





spot buy actions. The most common method of procuring SPCC
managed material is through sole source negotiation, which
accounted for a huge 74% share of the actions of all methods
used and likewise accounted for 74% of the value of all
methods/actions. Competitive negotiation followed with roughly
14% of all actions while formally advertised procurements
encompassed 10.6% of the total.
Purchase orders, in general, and priced, fast-pay purchase
orders were the most commonly used contractual vehicles,
garnishing nearly 58% of all actions and approximately 10%
of the: value of total dollars committed (all purchase order
types) . Orders under Basic Ordering Agreements (BOA) accounted
for 48% of the total dollar value committed (9.7% of all
actior.s) , followed by awards obtained via the negotiation
process amounting to nearly 19% of the total dollar value
(2.4% of all actions)
.
The categories of material falling under the purchasing
responsibility of SPCC ' s Contracting Department is lengthy
and comprehensive. By far, shipboard equipment receives the
most attention. 1H and 7H COG shipboard material accounted
for over 70% of all purchase actions in FY81, but electronics,
test equipment, ordnance and material handling equipment also
contributed to the hefty workload. This material was procured,
not only for stock replenishment, but in support of many
important Navy programs including the BB-62 reactivation




The duties and responsibilities of SPCC's Contracting
Department are multi-faceted and critical to the effectiveness
of the Supply Operations Group and the Weapons Systems Sup-
port Group which make up the heart of SPCC's management mis-
sion. The success of SPCC's mission depends on its ability
to provide material to meet its customers demands, which of
course, can only be accomplished through the efficient utili-
zation of its purchasing arm, its organization-industry
interface. To be a responsible element in the total SPCC
mission, the Contracting Department must set realistic objec-
tives in the same manner as that accomplished by industrial
and private purchasing concerns. As Lee and Dobler note in
Purchasing and Materi als Management , the basic objectives of
purchasing should be to:
1. Support Company (organizational) operations with
an uninterrupted flow o:: materials and services
2. Buy competitively (where feasible) and wisely
3. Develop reliable alternate sources of supply
4. Develop good, continuing vendor relationships
5. Achieve maximum integration with other depart-
ments of the firm (organization)
6. Train and develop highly competent personnel who
are motivated to make the firm (organization) as
well as their department, succeed.
7. Develop policies and procedures which permit
accomplishment of the preceding objectives at the
lowest reasonable operating cost (cost to the
Government) . [Ref . 8]
All parentheses in Steps 1-7 of this list are provided
by the thesis author.
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As we shall see, where feasible, these objectives impact
heavily on the well being and efficient operation of the
department, but the ability to realistically meet these objec-
tives in the face of an ever changing environment filled with
converging and conflicting demands, duties and responsibilities,
is often suspect. Nevertheless, the Contracting Department's
responsibilities are clearly set and well recognized. We will
now see how the department has been organized in its efforts
to meet its mission.
D. CONTRACTING DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
A knowledge of the functional element's responsibilities
brings with it a need for a clear recognition of the operating
tasks associated with each responsibility. Proper organi-
zational structure achieves this purpose. "Three principal
factors largely determine the level of performance attained
by a group of people: (1) capabilities of the personnel,
(2) motivation of the personnel, and (3) the organizational
structure within which the personnel function, " [Ref. 9].
Functionalization evolved from the results of studies
conducted by Frederick Taylor, relating to specialization of
the workforce. The basic concept provides that when similar
activities are grouped together, maximum efficiency is obtained
in the quest to reach overall organizational objectives. As
can be seen from Exhibit (A) , the old Contracting Division
Organizational Chart (corresponding to the organizational
structure being phased out in late 19 82, the time period in
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which thesis research was conducted) , the organizational
structure then in existence, failed to take advantage of
efficiencies obtained through greater functionalization. For
example, Buying Branch Number 1 performed such diversified
tasks as purchasing ordnance as contrasted to electrical
equipment, and HME&O material as opposed to purchasing for
FMS . Increasing the scope of activities necessary to be
monitored and controlled, especially by a limited management
staff signif ican-cly broadens the scope of each managers job,
which may or may not place the job above the manager's realiza-
ble ability. The organization was then, creating for itself
a situation wherein downstream administrative management
problems could be traced back to a lack of pre-award manage-
ment attention. This problem was fostered not through a lack
of desire or ability on the part of the responsible manager,
but by a sheer inability to cope based on scope and diversity.
Functionalization, of course, is not an end in itself. When
an organization is too functionalized it runs into the prob-
lem of losing sight of overall objectives because extreme
narrowness of focus tends to take the place of the realization
of what "we are really here for". Notwithstanding its dis-
advantages, the need for some level of increased functionali-
zation is readily apparent.
SPCC, like virtually all governmental agencies, cannot
afford the supervisory costs associated with employing a large
number of subordinate managers, under the branch manager,
responsible for supervising a relatively small number of
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personnel. This would be an optimum situation wherein the
activities of branch personnel could be carefully monitored
and controlled, and since the levels of management in the
Contracting Department would not be too deep, communications
would not be sacrificed. Unfortunately, absent this scenario,
the Contracting Department is forced to place the supervision
of many employees in the hands of a very few managers. A
manager in this situation tends to focus on a broader range of
activities and becomes more of a generalist. Being a gener-
alist, in and of itself, is not all bad, but put into the
framework of a diverse organizational structure we can see
the beginnings of an inbred organizational inefficiency. This
stems from a structural need that requires operating personnel
to be capable of making a broader range of decisions because
less direct and detailed supervision and control is available
to them. Experience has shown that although a number of
individual workers have the ability and desire to make relevant
decisions, the greater whole does not and the organization
suffers because of it.
The ideal, lacking (or at least conceptually so) prior to
the end of 19 82, was the desirability of grouping assigned
operating tasks in a manner that facilitates managerial con-
trol. As Peter Drucker noted, "To improve organization
structure. . .will therefore always improve performance," [Ref.
10]. Exhibit (A-l) shows the new Contracting Department
organization at SPCC put into effect early in fiscal year 19 83.
It can clearly be seen that the new organizational structure
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is much more highly functionalized than the old. The new
structure more clearly specifies authority and responsibility
for each operating activity. For instance, under the old
structure, code 371 (buying branch number 1) , was responsible
for:
A) purchasing material for stock
B) immediate issue FMS spot buys
C) FMS special program requirements
D) for processing CASREP requisitions and ensuring the
materials delivery
E) for performing expediting functions
The new "division", code 021, the Hull Mechanical and Electri-
cal Contracting Division, quite simply, "Contracts for all
Hull, Mechanical and Electrical Material Supplies, services
and associated requirements in support of the Hull, Mechani-
cal and Electrical Support Department, code 50, of the Weapons
Support Group, code 05." Gone is the diversification of tasks
and responsibilities, including expediting and CASREP con-
tracting. Duties, tasks and responsibilities now have a
common thread, are more uniform and lend themselves to im-
proved efficiencies by consolidating into more specialized
working groups that can more easily be dealt with by the
generalist manager.
The Contracting Department, under the new organizational
scheme, divides rather easily into five general classifica-






D) Special Staff Work
E) Clerical
Even more specialized tasks, as will be seen, are derived from
each of the major classifications and provide for a high degree
of specialization allowing for even greater flexibility in ex-
panding the workforce to meet operational needs.
The responsibilities of the Contracting Department, code
02, were detailed in Section B, above. The major buying
divisions established to help meet these responsibilities are
divided into four separate functional groups. These divisions,
along with their designated buying functions, have other re-
lated duties which include:
A) acquisition planning and review
B) emergency expediting for critical items
C) cost and price analysis
D) negotiations
E) determinations of reasonableness and responsibility
F) contractor assistance
G) market analysis
The various branches associated with each major division
have the same basic duties as shown above, tailored to their
specific function. Exhibits (C-F) illustrate the structure
and divisional breakdown of the major buying divisions. It
should be noted that the Special Contracts Division, code 024,
while having the same basic functions as the other buying
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divisions, is unique in that it supports more of a diversity
of accounts, for example:
A) support of operating needs of tenant activities
B) CASREP/high priority ICP purchases
C) FMS requirements
D) repairables under SPCC cognizance
The Contract Management Division, discussed in detail in
Section D, below, can be considered as both a buying and an
administrative element chat supports the major buying divi-
sions. Primary clerical responsibility falls under the cogni-
zance of the Contract Services division, code 026, shown in
Exhibit F. This division is responsible for:
A) "control, filing, drafting, typing, assembly and
distribution of parchase documents" [Ref. 12]
B) file maintenance and bidder information
C) internal auditing and data reporting
Finally, the Contracting Department Staff, code 02A1, is com-
posed of senior management personnel including the Chief of
the Contracting Office, a Navy Captain, legal counsel, a
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) representative, a clerical
staff and other special staff personnel. Basic functions of
the department staff, are to:
A) direct the purchasing function
B) maintain functional liaison with other commands
C) interpret and promulgate policy and procedure
D) act as the SPCC contract review board
E) perform other important managerial duties relevant
to exercising major contracting authority.
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Provided with an illustration of the Contracting Depart-
ment, its responsibilities and organization, focus will now
be directed to a smaller segment of the operating organization,
the Contract Management Division, to begin to irore closely
focus on the immediate operations and involvements that are
most closely associated with problems of management this
thesis seeks to address.
E. THE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT DIVISION
The organizational breakdown of the Contract Management
Division is shown in Exhibit G. The division, code 25, per-
forms selected contract administration functions, primarily
on "fast pay" type orders and acts as the principle contracting
officer (PCO) monitor for all "C" type contract. s and BOA
orders. The division is responsible for:
A) analyzing and monitoring contractor performance
B) expediting and administering selected high priority
requirements






5) finalizing unpriced orders
6) performing the full range of administrative




The division is headed by a Navy Lieutenant Commander with
principal assistance and guidance of a functional nature being
provided by an experienced assistant branch head and four
branch supervisors. The divisional structure is broken down
into four functional branches generally headed by a GS-11
supervisor
.
The Ammunition and Other Special Programs Branch, is
responsible for contract administration on all ammunition
contracts. (It should be remembered that SPCC has central
management responsibility for conventional ammunition.)
Further, the branch has contract administration and monitoring
responsibility for special program contracts such as Poseidon,
United Kingdom Programs, etc. The branch, in late 19 82, had
ten people assigned to it (not including clerical or the
supervisor), with three vacant positions. In 19 82 there were
greater than 1600 ammunition acquisition actions.
Two of the four contract management branches are responsi-
ble for regional administration of SPCC contracts. The
Eastern United States branch covers contracts being performed
in the East, while the Western United States branch works with
DCAS regions in the West. Combined, these branches employ 2 7
workers with two vacancies (as of late 1982) . Basic duties
include:
A) exercising the full gamut of authorized administrative
processes including preparation and execution of
unilateral and bilateral modifications
B) conducting production drawing approval administration
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C) reviewing and monitoring contractor performance
D) problem solving and vendor relations
E) terminations, claims settlements and progress
payments
F) tooling records maintenance
Finally, the External Acquisitions/Contract Expedite
Branch is primarily responsible for monitoring contractor
performance on high interest contracts and for expediting and
performing follow-up actions to ensure timely deliveries of
material. This branch monitors contract delivery delay notices
received from DCAS and prepares input to update SPCC's computer
files. The branch also processes status/expedite requests on
end use requirements, initiates appropriate actions to resolve
delinquencies using computer generated data and processes
status requests from stock points, along with other essential
duties. The branch has 15 employees.
In rough outline, then, the Contract Management Division
has administrative cognizance over all SPCC generated con-
tracts, delivery orders and BOA ' s including point of contact
responsibility for administration of DCAS assigned contracts
and first line responsibility for "fast pay" spot buys. No
contract administration is performed in or by the major buying
divisions. It may be considered that each of SPCC's nearly
100,000 contract actions (including MOD • s over and under $10K)
,
processed in FY81 found its way into the files of the Contract
Management Division. Some required action, some did not. On
top of this total should be included prior years contracts
37

not yet completed, that require some form of administration.
More precisely, all contracts awarded by SPCC, which require
some form of administrative action, will go to the Contract
Management Division.
To round out our exploration of the management environment
in which the procurement of stock and in-use items exists, we
must examine the workload faced by the personnel of the Con-
tract Management Division to provide an initial perspective
on the uniqueness or singularity of this particular procurement
arena.
F. WORKLOAD CHARACTERISTICS
Experience has shown that roughly half of all award actions
completed in a given year, will require some form of adminis-
trative action. This has; held true at SPCC where its Con-
tract Management Division faced over 50,000 administrative
actions of one form or another in FY19 81, which saw total
contract actions in excess of 100,000. Also to be included
are the over 4 5,00 "fast pay" purchase order spot buy actions
performed, which are the sole responsibility of the Contract
Management Division, This roughly equates to between 175-20
active, open cases on each administrator's desk per month (the
degree of difficulty of each action would have a profound
effect on the substance of that figure) . Contrast this to a
comparable (both in size and function) organization in the
industrial sector facing one third the volume with an equal
number of employees who perform both buying and all administration
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This group faces a monthly, open caseload of perhaps 40-60
actions. Whereas the industrial agents may deal with 4000-
5000 contractors each year depending on the size of their
supplier base, SPCC's agents face upwards of 7,000 each year,
some with as many as 20 active contracts apiece.
The work is performed by a staff consisting mainly of GS-5
through GS-9 with the lower grades acting as expediters and
dealing with initial delinquencies and the higher- grades
handling the tougher assignments. Education has traditionally
been on-the-job with the few DOD or Navy sponsored training
courses being utilized as permitted by schedules and funding.
The absence of a variety of higher grade assignments leads to
a high rate of attrition in the workforce especially following
promotion to a grade above GS-9 where no gratifying work, save
the few supervisor slots, is available to bo occupied and the
individual is faced with seeking other opportunities. The
buying divisions have traditionally had higher grade assign-
ments than the Management Division. In the industrial sector,
in-house training and cooperative ventures with local univer-
sities along with broad on-the-job taining allows them to
realize a more highly educated workforce comprised of approxi-
mately 70% BA/BS degree recipients. SPCC's Contract Managemeni
staff is well below this figure.
The diversity and scope of the workload is enormous. The
Contract Management staff must deal with upwards of 100,00
actions that may have been for stock, may have been for one
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time use or for ammunition; the actions may have resulted
from an advertised vehicle or they may have been negotiated,
possibly (probably) even sole-source. They could be in the
form of a purchase order, BOA, delivery order, modification,
BPA call, negotiated agreement or be a formally advertised
award. They may be valued at anywhere from $1 to over $1
million and may represent something as simple as a latch for
a watertight door to a circuit board for a Poseidon submarine,
the absence of which may force the sub to not meet its criti-
cal commitments. The customers may range from a tugboat to a
Nimitz Class aircraft carrier, with parts status being re-
quested by anyone from a storekeeper to an admiral. All of
this must be accomplished in the face of a lack of adequate
staffing for the volume of work faced, constricted response
times (to preclude loss of government rights) , low grade
levels, high individual workloads and constant turnover. The
face of the procurement environment being developed is one of
intense pressure created by the need to support a high level
of demand with few available resources. Management by excep-
tion becomes the rule because sheer volume precludes the use
of more ordered techniques to ensure one's mission responsi-
bilities are met. Where delinquencies are concerned, the above
described environment has engendered a management response





No one would argue the fact that today's Navy is a highly
complex, highly automated organization that has, to a great
degree, supplanted the need for large numbers of shipboard
personnel by substituting machines to do the work that man
once performed. From simple housekeeping tasks to early
warning and command and control, the Nav/ has dramatically
increased the technical complexity of its warships. Likewise
the Navy has also increased the level of technical dependency
that it must subject itself to if it is going to have the
luxury of utilizing the vast resources these systems offer.
A single surface to air defense system contains nearly a
quarter of a million feet of wire, over 10,000 resistors plus
thousands of capacitors, relays and other electronic devices
plus a myriad of other interworking functional components.
Consider the many different classes of ships in the Navy, the
variety of weapons suites, the different power plants, mixtures
of navigation systems, ordnance, auxiliary systems, and communi-
cations units, down to the very galley equipment used to feed
the crews. All these, and more, are essential to the opera-
tional integrity of the vessels they support. They are also,
because of their complexity and heavy reliance on an enormous
number of integrated parts (notwithstanding their high, pub-
lished, mean time between failures) , subject to varying periods
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of downtime because of system inoperability . Without the
necessary repair part support, the crew is unable to repair
the system in place, and the ship's overall readiness ana
mission capability may be severely jeopardized as a result.
On a large scale, problems of this sort could prove devastating.
In fact, many ships do suffer substantial capability
degradation because of parts non-availability. There are many
reasons why these ships cannot obtain needed parts, and it
would be misleading to place the entire blame on the shoulders
of industry. Evidence is abundant, however, supporting the
claim that delinquency, on the part of Navy contractors, plays
a key role, in exacerbating the shortage of repair parts
needed to support the fleet. The Navy, in fact, is experiencing
a serious problem arising out of late deliveries of materia.,
ordered to replenish inventories of repair parts and consuma-
ble items. Navy wide, it has been estimated that 25% [Ref . 13]
of all hardware contracts experience some delay in their re-
quired deliveries. At first glance this figure appears some-
what high, as related to stock and in-use item procurement.
This is most likely due to the inclusion of production con-
tracts, in general, which may or may not be related to stock
items. A more reasonable percentage figure, derived from
statistical sampling, records review and personal interview,
fluctuates between 17%-19%. This figure does not include late
delivery data for spot buys of in-use items. Since the volume
of spot buys is nearly equal to the volume of stock acquisition
actions in a given year, and because spot buys are very low
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volume (usually one each), "one shot" events, to contractors
who are, likely as not, non-defense oriented, it is reasonable
to assume that late deliveries in this category approach or
equal the percentage rate for stock buys. In sum, allowing
for some error, the overall rate of late deliveries of stock
and in-use items, must equal or slightly exceed the apparently
"somewhat high" figure of 25% noted above.
In Chapter I, it was established that not all late deliveries
are contractor caused. An adjustment in the overall percentage
figure is needed then, to establish that portion of late de-
liveries that is considered to be the sole fault of the con-
tractor, or delinquent. As shown in Chapter I, Section C,
over 80% (actually, as sampled, the figure is closer to 85%)
of all late deliveries are, according to the terms described
earlier, delinquent. This means that roughly 20% of all stock
and in-use contracts can be classified as delinquent.
SPCC, as a weapons system life cycle manager, has, in effect,
cradle to grave responsibility for the repair parts support
of the Navy's expanding fleet. According to DOD, a key element
in the readiness capability of this fleet, is the assurance
that SPCC can satisfy 85% of all requests for stock items
immediately from on-hand resources. Add to this SPCC '
s
responsibility to respond to immediate need (NSI) requests
from the fleet and it can clearly be seen that the "responsive
supply support to the fleet" credo is severely tasked. This
difficult mission is complicated when 20% of the contracts,
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needed to fill on-hand resources or provide for immediate
fleet support, fall delinquent.
The problem of delinquency is not unique to the Navy, nor
is it limited to t.ne procurement of stock and in-use items.
What is unique, however, is the preponderance of contractor
fault as contrasted to government fault in this particular
"house" of procurement. In systems and commodity procurement,
the ratio of contractor to government fault, when assessing
responsibility for late deliveries, is closer to 50/50. More
important, the impact of delinquency in stock and in-use item
procurement hits much closer to home because real-time opera-
tional effectiveness is directly impaired by parts non-
availability. Delinquency in systems and commodity procurement
is also sorely felt, but in neither case is actual fleet capa-
bility jeopardized to the extent that a warship would be con-
sidered incapacitated because of it.
The delinquency problem, as peculiar to SPCC, is the sub-
ject of this chapter. Features of the existing procurement
environment, will be analyzed in an effort to provide insight
as to why at least a portion of the delinquency problem may
be considered a function of this somewhat unique environment.
Following this, the chapter will move to a detailed review of
just what shape the problem takes; its magnitude, relationships,
characteristics and so on. In addition, some very basic
mangement considerations will be discussed, to include, how
management perceives the problem and responds to it, and the
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limitations it faces in doing so. Finally, the chapter con-
cludes with a synthesis of the many ideas and considerations
presented thus far, providing a perspective on the inseparable
relationship of problem to environment:.
B. AS A FUNCTION OF A UNIQUE ENVIRONMENT
The problem of delinquency may be linked to two character-
istics which provide the element of uniqueness to this particu-
lar procurement environment. The two characteristics are:
A) the dynamism of the process
B) the management of the process by a public entity.
First, consider the dynamism of the process. Dynamism is a
term that refers to an explanation of a given environment in
terms of forces and their interplay. It is proposed here,
that these forces are characterized by factors which are, to
a large extent, unique to this procurement environment. Their
interplay creates, between the customer (SPCC) and its suppliers,
a dichotomy of often conflicting goals, objectives, needs and
desires. This dichotomy manifests itself in many system ail-
ments, not the least of which is delinquency on the part of
Navy parts suppliers. An illustration and discussion of some
of the more salient factors associated with this environment
should give credence to this hypothesis.
The SPCC supplier base for stock and in-use items is in
excess of 7,000 indivudal sources. Some are large firms that
are vertically integrated and supply their own parts and sub-
assemblies. The bulk, however, are small firms that may
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reasonably be characterized as "parts suppliers", dealing pri-
marily in tubes, gauges, valves, instruments and so forth,
for subsystems. These parts are, for the most part, used in
both weapons and commercial products. While some of these
firms are completely dedicated to defense business, the majority
of them are heavily involved in commercial practice and respond
to military requirements in many cases, only as an alternative
to ensure they utilize existing capacity, keep their workforce
actively engaged and assure themselves of some measure of
future cash flow. Few would argue that the expected rate of
return on a commercial venture (other factors considered)
,
provides much more incentive to the contractor to take his
business there than settle for less return on his effort in
the defense sector. Likewise, the prospect of volume stability
and the knowledge that good performance (over other factors
stressed by DOD) will assure continuing business relationships,
draws the contractor further away from reliance on defense
contracts. These factors are representative of just a few of
the forces behind the lack of contractor commitment to Navy
work. This lack of commitment is one of the root causes of
the delinquency problem. Other equally important factors that
provide for a dichotomy of perspective and lead to contractor
intransigence are:
1) Fleet usage data is often erratic and inaccurate. If
a particular part is not in stock, when requested, the customer
will often obtain the item in a manner that circumvents the
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"system" creating a lack of usage/demand data needed for re-
quirements determination. This action degrades inventory
(stock) control efficiency, and causes replenishment to occur
(for a variety of items) at erratic intervals. This means
SPCC must pass the volume inefficiencies down to the parts
suppliers. If the suppliers choose to de-emphasize these
commitments because of their random nature and delivery is
late, the material may have to be reconsigned (material
originally procured for stock must be passed directly to the
end-user) and thus never enter the stock system. The cycle
then repeats itself, eroding otherwise healthy relationships.
2) Many material items require special consideration.
Take, for instance, the battleship New Jersey reactivation
project. This is a warship of World War II vintage that up
until just over a year ago had been inactive since Vietnam.
Gauges, valves, piping, tubing, and the lot had to be replaced
or at least duplicated to provide spares. This monumental
task had to be faced by the parts suppliers and the SPCC
procurement managers. Were the original suppliers out of
business? If so, do the replacement parts need to be redesigned
and refabricated? Who will do the job? At what cost? How
long will it take? Are parts suppliers willing to retool for
what benefits there are to be gained? Will those that are
willing, be motivated to deliver the items on time? This is
an extremely difficult aspect of the parts procurement environ-
ment. Because of the advent of new programs such as the
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battleship reactivation, the procurement manager must, in many
cases, put aside good business judgment and make award to the
supplier who will meet this peculiar requirement. The procure-
ment manager must then rely, often to his detriment, on the
good graces of the supplier to meet all contractual obligations,
including delivery. Need has superceded management flexibility
in this case.
3) A corollary to the above would be the processing of spot
buys. These represent 50% of all work performed by the Con-
tract Management Division. Spot buys are processed by SPCC
to fill NSI requests from the fleet. Virtually all spot buys
are for a quantity cf one each. If the item is noncommercial
and not stocked it must be fabricated. What factors would
motivate the supplier to eagerly pursue such a contract?
Again, to fulfill the need, the manager must contract with
whoever is willing to perform on such a low level task. In
such cases, and like #2 above, getting the job done takes
higher priority over who does it and the manager, by default,
sets himself up for a downstream administrative ordeal, usually
centering around delinquency.
4) The non-integrated, smaller parts suppliers have tra-
ditionally been noted for poor production, planning and control.
This is one of the prime sources of the delinquency problem,
ranking higher than any other factor save the supplier's ina-
bility to control his own sources of supply. Regardless, it
may reasonably be argued that the two characteristics, together,
contribute the most toward promoting delinquency in stock and
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in-use item procurement. The Navy requires its contractors
"to translate the terms and requirements of their contracts
into orderly steps such as: purchase of materials , fabrica-
tion of components, manufacture and assembly of end items and
packaging and shipment" [Ref. 14]. Relative to vendor control,
the supplier's purchasing system should be designed to support
the internal production process by solidifying requirements
and placing contracts with reliable and capable subcontractors
and vendors. Why reality does not meet the expectations of
the Navy, may be answered in a number of ways. First, for
many of these firms, long range scheduling and control take a
back seat to increased cash flow (what there is of it) and
100% capacity utilization. Second, many par:s suppliers simply
do not know what their capacity is, or if they do, they opti-
mistically overestimate it (or their capability to perform
within it) . Third, many (most) of these concerns do not have
what can be considered to be a professional management staff
(even the huge, vertically integrated, major defense firms
allow parts production, planning and control to take a back
seat to most other commitments) . Planning and control is
accomplished through the experience of a foreman or a super-
visor that "knows the people and the plant." Rarely does a
formal system of control such as Line of Balance exist in
these firms. Even more simplistic phase planning or milestone
variance charts are seldom considered. Similarly, the absence
of vendor control is widespread. The majority of these firms
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simply do not provide the volume of business necessary to
exercise leverage over their material suppliers, who are in
many cases larger than the parts suppliers themselves.
5) Finally, the frequent use of negotiation on a sole-source
basis for the procurement of stock and in-use items must be
considered a major feature of this procurement environment
and a substantial contributor to the delinquency problem. In
the over ten thousand dollar range, sole-source negotiation
was used in over nine thousand actions which equated to 74%
of the total. There are five basic situations wherein nego-
tiation on a sole-source basis is acceptable, but what it
really boils down to is the fact that no other known source
has the capability of meeting the requirement. If this is so,
and it appears to be so in nearly 75% of the cases, the pro-
curement manager is effectively divested of whatever leverage
he might normally have, to secure contractor performance.
Since the sole-source supplier is needed to fulfill the require-
ment, it is in the enviable position of being able to dictate
terms (and price) . Complacency takes the place of achieve-
ment because there is no competition, work is guaranteed and
any remedies the Navy might seek to apply against the contrac-
tor are mitigated by the overriding need to obtain the end
result. All five variables are impacted in this type of
environment, especially the fifth.
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The second element which gives rise to the uniqueness of
this environment is the fact that the procurement process is
managed by a public entity. It will be shown that this char-
acteristic not only provides a vehicle for the formulation and
growth of the delinquency problem but actually serves to
impede the problem-solving process.
Both public and private sector management environments
are a composite of existing strata (rules, regulations, proce-
dures and traditional relationships) , and dynamic forces that
constantly seek to alter the environment's complexion. The
existing strata initially dictates the boundaries and estab-
lishes the framework within which the procurement process is
performed. Over time, dynamic forces of interaction (such as
those discussed above) , enter into the formula seeking to rede-
fine the manner of performance. The process, as changed by
the dynamism of interacting forces, becomes increasingly
inefficient because of the static nature of the existing strata.
The basic difference between public and private sector res-
ponse to such change is as follows:
A) In the private sector, the overall objective is to maxi-
mize return on a given investment, and among others, enhance
the firm's competitive posture in its particular market. This
being so, management is free, within a responsive management
environment, to exercise a great deal of flexibility to develop,
implement and use a wide range of tools and techniques best
suited to enable the firm to meet its overall objectives.




The key term to remember is flexibility. When the dynamism
of the environment demands change in the existing strata to
preclude inefficiency and problem formulation (not to say that
there are no problems :.n the private sector) , the private sec-
tor manager has the ability to exercise a great deal of flexi-
bility in changing the existing strata to meet the new demands
placed upon it. Therefore, as discussed in Chapter I, the
private sector has the capability of exercising a great deal
of control over the degree to which any one of the five varia-
bles might change during the course of a procurement cycle.
B) There are over 800 separate procurement entities in the
public sector. As a result, there is a multiplicity of end
objectives some of whi rh are unclear, subjective and not at
all susceptible to the same amount of quantifiability as in
the private sector. The management environment begins, not
with the entity actually, physically performing the process,
but with the public at large whose will presents itself in
Congress. Rather than operate with the degree of autonomy
and flexibility necessary to efficiently meet all end objec-
tives, the procurement manager of a public entity must first
assess his accountability to the public, Congress, GAO , various
Offices of Inspectors General and the press. Then, he must
proceed through the manifestation of this "will" which is
embodied in statute, executive order, agency regulation and
standard operating procedures, before employing what tools
are left, to resolve the strata/dynamism conflict.
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Thus, the essential difference between the public and
private sector procurement managers, is the ability to respond
with flexibility to changing conditions. Inflexibility pro-
vides a source of origin and growth of the delinquency problem.
The public sector manager is every bit as competent as his
private sector counterpart and each has the expertise to
distinguish early warning signs of problem formulation . What
they do not share is an ability to change their existing strata
to meet new demands and thus prevent many problems before they
have the time to grow. There are other aspects of the distinc-
tion between public and private sector procurement management
that deserve mention here because they too have an impact on
delinquency problem management.
As noted in Chapter II, the first organizational objective
of procurement is to support the organization's operations
with an uninterrupted flow of materials and services. Whereas
the operations of a private entity are generally production
support, the public's (SPCC) is largely consumption by a third
party. In the private sector, most firms have a buyer control
his particular procurement (s) from birth to death. The most
critical factor for him, at the outset, is "schedule." The
buyer is inured with a commitment to respond to "when needed"
first and then cost and other factors second. As a result, a
great deal of management attention is applied to the procurement,
on the front end, to ensure clear sailing (with regard to timely
delivery) downstream. In the public sector and at SPCC, the
situation is somewhat different. Oversight of the expenditure
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of public funds is intensive. Because of this, one of the
primary (measurable) objectives of the public sector is economic
efficiency. In the non-major system procurement environment,
cost or price becomes the primary mover. Unlike the private
sector, public sector concerns separate the buying and adminis-
tering functions (usually because of the enormous workloads...
see Chapter II, Section F) . The result of this is to take
from the buyer a sense of dedication and commitment to ensure
the success of his particular action and replace it with a near
term desire to meet the five variables of the procurement equa-
tion as best he can and then pass the responsibility to someone
else. Success is measured in awards made and dollars saved
rather than an accountable analysis of how well all five varia-
bles have been met and managed. This shifting of responsibility
and accountability from a buyer to an administrator creates a
management gap that allows for the growth of many problems,
including delinquency.
Related to the above, is industry's practice of nurturing
traditional business relationships. The buyer not only con-
trols the procurement from start to finish, he also tends to
consistently deal with the same sources of supply. As shown
above, an administrator in the public sector is usually not
involved in the buying end of a procurement. Absent the power
to award contracts, the administrator is frequently given
second billing by suppliers. The private sector buyer, on
the other hand, exercises a great deal of control over suppliers
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because he holds other contracts and orders of interest to him.
While the buyer is following up on a previous action, he has
the visibility of other actions waiting to be processed.
This provides leverage for the buyer and ensures he'll be
listened to. Buyer/supplier rapport is a key element
in the problem-solving, problem-avoidance area.
Suppliers are especially sensitive to not jeopardize their
relationships with key clients and therefore will go out of
their way to work with the buyer to solve any outstanding
problems. Statutory and regulation considerations and the
buyer/administrator split, paint a different picture for the
public sector. Political, social and economic considerations
embodied in statute, regulation and policy requires the pub-
lic entity procurement manager to, in many cases, make award
en other than purely business considerations. The ability to
choose the "best" supplier in every procurement and foster
relationships only with those serving the best interests of
the entity, is absent. Suppliers (with the exception of
some sole-source firms) , for the same reasons, cannot count
on establishing fruitful, long-term relationships with the
public source. This reduces the dependency of the supplier
on the customer, leaving the customer little business leverage.
The buyer 'administrator split further exacerbates the situation
because neither has the long-term ability to effectively deal
with the supplier. Each is part of the process at separate
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points. The buyer has little true control over who receives
the award, and once awarded has nothing more to do with the
action. The administrator has no power of the purse (regard-
ing awards) and no say in the mechanics of the initial award.
The supplier, recognizing such, has far more latitude to
deviate from contractual provisions, with success, than he
would when dealing with a private sector firm. This is not
to say that suppliers jump at each opportunity to be intransi-
gent. Rather, the opportunity to do so is far more available
in the public sector than in the private. Public sector
management is, thus, greatly impeded in the problem-solving,
problem-avoidance process by criteria deeply implanted within
the system.
Another segment of t.iis distinction relates to the status
of the parties involved in the process. In the private sector,
size and financial strength largely differentiate between the
status of parties and their role in business relationships.
Nevertheless, each is equal in the law. In the public sector,
the sovereignty of the buyer directly affects the buyer/supplier
relationship. Lasting relationships evolve, in the private
sector, from mutually beneficial long-term commitments.
Although a determination of non-responsibility may be
filed to shift award to other than a low bidder, the determina-
tion may be contested and overturned, especially by a small
business. Negotiated awards in stock and in-use item procure-
ment are made primarily on the basis of cost/price with the
low offeror usually being successful. The buyer has little
or no latitude in the award of sole-source requirements.
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Because of the equality in law relationship of private sector
firms, long-term commitments and continuity of requirements
are prevalent. In the public sector, the prevailing party
can change its mind at any time before, during or after con-
tract award. The perceptions and policies of the sovereign
frequently change. These changes affect procurement proce-
dures, clauses, costs, volume, scope of programs, and virtually
anything else under its preeminence. The results of these
changes are often severe, always disruptive. As a consequence,
commitment to the public sector is thin and long-term relation-
ships few.
In summary, this segment has sought to portray delinquency
as a function of a unique environment. The uniqueness of the
environment revolved around the fact that a certain dynamism
inherent in the process created an interaction of forces
peculiar to stock and in-use item procurement. This provided
for a dichotomy of goals, objectives, needs and desires be-
tween the customer and the supplier. This dichotomy manifested
itself in a lack of commitment on the part of the supplier
toward his Navy contracts. The lack of commitment was attri-
butable to a number of factors which included:
A) lack of expected profit or return
B) changing requirements and volume variations
C) peculiar requirements




All of the above, it was proposed, led to supplier intransi-
gence, lack of proper management control and therefore,
delinquency. A second source of environmental uniqueness
centered around the fact that the procurement process was
managed by a public entity. As such, the management process
was marred because of:
A) inflexibility
B) lack of accountability and commitment
C) absence of relationships and managerial leverage
D) changing requirements
No doubt a more in-depth, comprehensive study would shed light
on numerous additional characteristics of the stock and in-use
procurement environment that contribute to the problem of
delinquency, but it is hoped that the above gives some indica-
tion of the depth of the problem. Solving the problem is
not as simple as shifting a few resources or developing a new
management information system. The problem begins deep inside
the core of the system. It is part of it and will likely
alwyas be there. Nonetheless, such vehicles of delinquency as
lack of supplier commitment may be attacked and mitigated by
first recognizing the root causes of it and then applying
aggressive management effort toward its resolution. Likewise,
inflexibility and other public entity related ills may be
overcome by a process of gradual system reform beginning in-
house and moving outward toward regulatory and policy reform.
These and other considerations will be more fully discussed in
Chapters IV and V.
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C. SCOPE AND CHARACTERISTICS
To this point, discussion has centered on the "larger"
aspect of the delinquency problem. From an overview of de-
linquency in general to an analysis of environmental character-
istics considered to be associated with the root causes of the
problem, the reader has had an opportunity to acquire a basic
framework of understanding. This section will further develop
that understanding by providing a detailed review of the delin-
quency problem as seen from the perspective of SPCC's Contract
Management Division. The specifics of the problem, its scope
and characteristics will be illustrated here.
Much of the data discussed, especially concerning indi-
vidual contractor delinquency, has been taken from SPCC's
Contractor Delinquency List (CDL) . This list, discussed in
depth in Section D of this chapter, is, briefly, a tool used
to monitor the status of SPCC cognizant contracts which are
currently delinquent. The remainder of the data has been
obtained via interview, records review, correspondence review,
sampling and spot audit. The intent of the data presentation
and analysis is to augment what has been learned about some
of the more covert vehicles of problem formulation with an
appreciation for the concrete overt facts confronting the
procurement manager as he goes about the problem-solving
process.
To begin the analysis, it would be appropriate to examine
what can be considered a classic example, from top to bottom,
of the problem of delinquency facing SPCC. The example is
59

taken from a summer assignment report prepared by LCDR D.J.
Feltes, SC, USN, while assigned to the Defense Contract
Administration Service Management Area (DCASMA) , Chicago,
Illinois. The purpose of the research effort was to deter-
mine the cause of the high rate of delivery delinquency
experienced in completion cf Navy contracts administered by
DCASMA Chicago.
The report noted that 6 9% of the 211 currently delinquent
contracts at DCASMA Chicago, were under the cognizance of SPCC.
Of SPCC's 14 6 delinquent contracts, fully 4 3% or 63 contracts
were in the hands of a single contractor, Target Corporation.
Target Corporation is a small business. Its livelinood is
centered around the fabrication of obsolete replacement or
short run replacement of current electronics equipment. As
highlighted in Section B (parts 2 and 3) of this chapter, many
contractors obtain Navy contracts because the Navy has nowhere
else to turn or the contractor fills a gap left by others not
willing to take on tzhe requirement. Target has mastered this
technique. Its experience in repeated follow-on parts replace-
ment for specific equipments and its large library of Navy
drawings, specifications and test procedures has allowed
Target Corporation to develop a Navy business niche that
prospers despite its high delinquency rate.
The driving force behind Target Corporation's high delin-
quency rate is its poor production, scheduling and control
and inadequate materials purchasing practices. This problem
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was discussed in Section B of this chapter. Up to the end of
19 82, Target relied on manual control systems for production
scheduling, materials ordering and for tracking and cost con-
trol, despite shipping a weekly volume of finished goods valued
at near $200,000. (To their credit, Target is in the process
of installing automated control systems.) Nearly 70% of all
of Target's delinquent contracts were the result of poor pro-
duction, scheduling and control.
In addition to poor control, and as proposed in Section
B, lack of contractor commitment is also a major contributing
factor to delinquency. As the Feltes report notes, Target
Corporation is no exception. The report shows that Target
consistently worded its requests for waiver or modification
in such a way as to confuse the government to such an extent
as to create a dilemma over who was actually responsible for
performance delays. These results are often sumitted just
prior to or after the performance date and provide relief for
the contractor in being able to disguise delinquency altogether
As proposed in the report, the contractor gains "...the ability
to manage his backlog, to optimize cash flew and avoid costly
overtime, facilities and personnel expansion, control systems
improvement and short term borrowing" [Ref. 15]. When a con-
tractor "games" the system in such a way as to provide for
its own benefit, to the detriment of the other party, it
shows a wholesale lack of commitment to fairly abide by all




The Target Corporation case is just one example of the
problem faced by an organization whose supplier base exceeds
7,000 individual sources. It is especially relevant, however,
because it is a real world example of the effects of factors
and considerations discussed earlier in this chapter and it
gives a great deal of perspective to the remainder of the
delinquent data to be presented here.
A statistical sample of 200 of the 2000 contractors listed
on the SPCC Contractor Delinquency List, dated Julian 8224 8,
was conducted to ascertain, among other things, the total value
of existing delinquent contracts and the overall delinquency
rate. It should be noted that the sample was taken after a
purge of contracts found to be completed, but not reported as
such and therefore not yet deleted from the listing (more will
be said about the listing in the next section) . A review of
the delinquency list, conducted by the Contract Management
Division yielded the following:
Contracts listed as open with SPCC: 6971
Contracts listed as delinquent before review: 1903
Contracts known to be delinquent after review: 1171
Difference: 732
Percent Delinquent as shown in report: 16.79%
The delinquency list shows stock buys only. Spot buys are
not recorded on the list.
2
The percentage rate as reported is questionable. The
ratio used for computation was 1171/6971 = 16.79%. However,
if 732 of 1903 contracts previously shown delinquent, were in
fact completed, the total "open" contracts figure must be
reduced accordingly. A more accurate assessment would be
1171-732 or 6239. The delinquency rate would then be:
1171/6239 = 18.76%. Of course, if some of the 732 were "open"
but found to be not delinquent, the ratio would have to be
adjusted accordingly. During interview, however, the purged
contracts were said to be "completed."
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Sources interviewed estimated the delinquency listing to be
anywhere from 60-65% in error. It is noted, however, that 732
of 1903 contracts listed as delinquent were in fact completed.
This points to an error rate of closer to 38%. The size of
the sample taken (10%), the mitigating quality of averaging
and the fact that the sample was taken after a review and
purge:, should provide some measure of accuracy to the data









Delinquency data thus obtained is as follows:
A) Total number of open contracts sampled
B) Total number of contractors involved
C) Total value of all open contracts sampled
D) Average value of open contracts sampled
E) Total value of all delinquent contracts
F) Total number of delinquent contracts
G) Average value of delinquent contracts









A reduction of the overall (sampled) delinquency rate by
the determined error of the listing (38%) , shows an overall
rate of 22.2% which is comparable to the figure proposed in








I) Individual Contractor average % delinquent :
J) Delinquent contract value as % of the total:
K) Average high value delinquent contract : $
L) Average low value delinquent contract : $
M) Highest dollar value delinquent contract : $
N) Lowest dollar value delinquent contract : $
0) 68 Contractors were 100% delinquent
equating to 34% of the sample
P) Delinquent contracts in (0) above were
valued at: $3,095,343
It is easy to see, from the sample data, that the pro-
curement managers task is anything but clear cut. While the
average delinquent contract is valued at over $17,000, the
range may vary from as low as $5.00 to over $1,000,000! How
does one approach 66% of the contractors that are from 1% to
99% delinquent as opposed to those who are 100% in the red?
The problem is real enough, however- When nearly 30% of the
value of all stock contracts are in a delinquent status, some-
thing is amiss. How then, does management go about developing
a strategy to deal with it? First, the manager needs to ac-
quaint himself with some of the more overt characteristics
that will provide him with an idea of which avenue to choose
to obtain the most cost-effective solution to the delinquency
problem.
A review and analysis of in-house Production Progress
Reports, DD FORMS 1654, complemented by a screening of DCAS




personnel interviews, yielded the following characteristics
of the delinquency problem:
- A sample of 200 DD FORMS 1654 was conducted to ascertain
Whether or not DCAS was consistently appraising the
SPCC administrator of the problem early enough to
allow for problem-avoidance actions to be initiated.
The reasons for the delay.
Results :
1. In 90% of the cases, the DD FORMS 1654 were processed
on the basis of actual delinquencies. In only 20 of 200
notices, did DCAS give advance warning of anticipate d delin-
quency. In most cases, the first notice was received well
after the contract had gone delinquent. It was found, per-
haps because of a backlog of work, that the "anticipatory"
notices were not acted upon once received. In fact, most
individuals interviewed were not aware of the actual/antici-
pated blocks on the form. Personnel supervisors appear to be
unaware of what action is being taken on the received notices,
Perhaps the reason for inaction rests with the recommendation
for action advised by DCAS. Predominantly the recommendation
is "leave delinquent."
2. Reasons for delinquency, as shown on the DD FORMS 16 54
are:
A) Poor production, planning and control
B) Inadequate purchasing and vendor control













As noted in Section B of this chapter, the biggest contri-
butors to the delinquency problem, 77% as shown above, are
poor production, planning and control and poor vendor control.
A sample of DCAS input for SPCC's Contractor Experience List,
seems to bear this out. Sixteen contractors were sampled,
some with delinquency rates as high as 100%. Reasons for
delinquency were:
A) Lack of vendor control
3) Internal scheduling problems
C) Accepting work above capacity, overloaded;
Correspondence from DCAS pointed to another interesting charac-
teristic of the delinquency problem that concerns the problem-
avoidance phase of contract formulation. According to DCAS,
and this is a view shared by many individuals interviewed,
SPCC does not conduct or request pre-award surveys with any
regularity. In virtually every piece of correspondence gener-
ated by DCAS, relating to a particular SPCC contractor, the
topic of pre-award survey is discussed. it is the belief of
DCAS that contracts are being awarded without the benefit of
pre-award surveys and, in some cases, without so much as an
inquiry as to the probability of satisfactory performance on
the part of the prospective contractor. This should be of
particular interest to the procurement manager because down
stream problems are often the result of an inappropriate award
Accepting work above capacity should be considered part
of poor scheduling and control.
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(taking into consideration the fact that, in some cases, award
is likely to be made even in the face of a negative responsi-
bility determination simply because no one else exists to do
the job)
.
Finally, some geographical data may be of interest to the
procurement manager, especially as it relates to focusing
strategy development and the use of liquidated damages. It






account for nearly 60% of the dollar value of all actions
processied by SPCC. Four of these states represent 65% of






The reader should consider the effort made and results obtained
by LCDR Feltes at DCASMA Chicago. Similar studies made at
the various DCASMA' s associated with the above states might
yield similar beneficial results. It would also be advised
that the procurement manager become familiar with the liquidated
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damages provisions of the above states in the event the use
of such leverage, after a review of the next chapter or other
related work, proves appropriate.
D. MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS: RECOGNITION AND RESPONSE
Armed with at least a modest appreciation of the particu-
lars that are related to the delinquency problem at SPCC, the
next logical step would be to £issess what is being done to
correct it. It is evident from the statistics that there is
a real and continuing problem. How then, does management
appraise itself of the delinquency situation and what tools
and techniques are used in the problem-solving process.
There are two major information sources internally avail-
able to the procurement manager, that allow him to gather
relevant delinquency data:
A) The Contractor Delinquency Listing (CDL)
B) The Contractor Experience List (CEL)
The CDL is a computer generated status list (see Exhibit
H)
,
provided to the Contract Management Division each month.
The listing details:
1. The contractor by FSCM, name and address
2. A columnar breakdown of all contractor/SPCC contracts
currently in a delinquent status
3. A summary total of all active contractor contracts
with SPCC, along with their total dollar value
4. A summary total of all currently delinquent contracts,
along with their total dollar value
5. Contractor total percent delinquent.
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The CDL is SPCC unique. It was developed by SPCC, for SPCC,
and is not used at any other activity. Seventy- five percent
of the listing's input comes from UICP, automatically gener-
ated, small purchase award data. The remainder, including
large contract award data and contract modification informa-
tion, enters the system manually. The system utilizes Military
Standard Contract Administration Procedures (MILSCAP) transac-
tion data. The computer program used for the CDL, executes a
number of logical transactions as it evaluates its data base
to determine delinquency. The Contract Management Division,
has established a 60 day delinquency "gate" for the program's
use. This 60 day gate is added to each contract required
delivery data (RDD) to allow for any slack in the reporting
process. For example, a contract may be complete 'i.e., goods
are delivered) but because of paperwork lead time, clerical
errors or routing delays, the PK9 card used for payment veri-
fication input may not have been processed and therefore the
contract may be listed as late. The 60 day gate i.3 used as
an aid to purify the list of these short duration administra-
tive deficiencies. Unfortunately, because of this necessity,
each contract that is actually delinquent, has been so for at
least 60 days before it is entered on the list for the first
time. MILSCAP PJJ cards are also used by the system to verify
shipment. Comparison is made by the system, of the PJJ card
quantity shown as shipped and the total contract quantity
listed in its data base. Corrections (updates) are then auto-
matically made to the CDL. The use of the word "Delinquency"
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in the title, is a misnomer, at least as it relates to the
definition of delinquency proposed in Chapter I of this thesis.
The delinquent contracts used in Section C, above, for sta-
tistical sampling, were verified to be actually delinquent
according to the definition in Chapter I. The CDL, however,
contains contracts that are both "delinquent" and "delayed"
but does not differentiate between them. The CDL simply notes
them all as delinquent. This is a negative aspect of the list,
because a substantial amount of time must be spent "debugging"
the list to separate delinquent contracts from those that are
late for other than contractor fault.
A single GS-5 is assigned to review and update the CDL
each month. Since there are over 2000 individual contractors
on the list, the review is generally limited to, perhaps 100-
150 contractors. The system is very slow to purge non-relevant
data from the listing, so this employee enters into a lengthy
process of checking computer records to see if contract pay-
ment has been made, verifying whether or not specific stock
items have been received and calling contractors themselves to
obtain personal status on listed contracts. The GS-5 also
reviews the actual contract files for status information, calls
the cognizant DCAS office and talks to contract administration
personnel on the floor, who may be a party to status information
not yet obtained. This entire, onerous, time consuming proc-
ess is designed to compensate for computer deficiencies. The
computer simply does not provide for continuous updating of
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the CDL, such as removing completed contracts from the list
and segregating delinquent contracts from others where the
government may have a hand in the delay. This is the reason
many individuals feel the CDL is 60-65% in error. As such,
the usefulness of the CDL is marginal at best. Branch super-
visors do not use the CDL. One branch supervisor had no idea
that the CDL even existed. Additionally, the CDL does not
contain spot buy action data, which represents virtually 50%
of the work performed by the Contract Management Division and
in itself represents work that is highly susceptible to
delinquency.
The CDL, in sum, is of little effective use as a manage-
ment information source. The listing is infrequently updated
and therefore highly susceptible to error. It is an information
offshoot of a much larger, non-procurement dedicated system
and as such is not designed to provide the type of accurate,
comprehensive information needed by the procurement manager.
At best, it may be considered a reference guide for supple-
mental data on the delinquency problem but it is not an
effective delinquency management tool.
A second delinquency management information source is
the Contractor Experience List (CEL) . A Contractor Per-
formance Board, at SPCC, reviews contract history data of
potential or actual problem suppliers. If a particular
contractor's past performance is such that a careful con-
sideration and review must be made on him prior to award,
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the firm is placed on the CEL . Prior to making an award to
a firm listed on the CEL, the buyer must obtain approval of
the action from the Contractor Performance Board ( axcept for
actions below $10,000).
The CEL is an excellent tool that provides the procurement
manager with comprehensive data on contractor performance and
a vehicle through which award may be withheld (within reason)
from historically poor performers. Excellent input data is
also received, upon request, from DCAS regarding firms recom-
mended for inclusion on the CEL. The DCAS letters provide
the procurement manager with detailed statistical and narrative
information regarding the firms in question. The sum of material
available to the procurement manager from the CEL process is
excellent and useful but there is a gap left in this informa-
tion process where the CEL ends.
The Contract Performance Board meets but cnce a quarter
(unless directed otherwise) . The CEL is reviewed and updated
at this time. Following the October 19 82 quarterly update,
the CEL was changed as follows:
Firms recommended to be retained on CEL: 20
Firms recommended to be added : 14
Firms recommended to be deleted : _4
Net: 30
Although the CEL represents the most consistent offenders, it
provides for only about 1% of all SPCC contractors that are,
or have been, delinquent. The board simply cannot, in the
space of time available to it, review and advise on each and
every delinquent contractor, so there is a gap where the
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review process ends. Unfortunately, the CDL takes up very
little of this slack. This leaves the procurement manager
with a single, efficient, though limited source of delinquency
management information. The bulk of real-time delinquency
data is not available to him. Instead, he must rely on a
problem-solving formula that combines exception management
and dedicated item support.
There is no doubt that the majority of delinquencies are
handled via the exception process. A scenario that provides
an example of why this is so is as follows: A contract has
been awarded by SPCC and as noted in an earlier section of
this chapter, responsibility then shifts from the buyer to the
administrator. Since performance has just been initiated,
the contract administrator has no need to take action on the
file so it passes along to the central file for temporary
storage. The awardee was a sole-source contractor. Even
though better judgment dictated otherwise, the buyer had to
make award to this firm because no one else was available to
do the work and the item was badly needed. A few weeks into
the contract, the contractor realized he had over-booked his
production capacity and began to fall behind on his Navy work.
From past experience, the contractor was certain that if he
said nothing, the Navy would not even know he was running
behind. DCAS , after nearly 90 days delinquency (as is the
noted reporting lead time for DD1654's) submitted the first
"actual" notice of delay in production via a DD Form 1654.
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Due to the immediate needs of an enormous workload, the notice
was overlooked, then filed to be worked on later. At DCAS
,
the industrial specialist, facing the same type of workload,
was assured by the contractor, after repeated inquiries, that
his earlier overload had bottomed out and he was now back on
schedule. The industrial specialist noted this on his next
DD Form 1654 to the administrator. Since he was too busy to
check personally, he decided to rely on the contractor's
submi.ssion. He therefore recommended "leave delinquent."
The administrator, absent a desire to add more work to his
already full schedule, complied with the DCAS recommendation.
The required delivery date (RDD) came and went. The contract
had shown up on the CDL a little earlier but had been one of
nearly 2000 on the list. It drew little attention. The con-
tractor was not on the CEL. The contract continued to lapse
unti!. the item manager finally realized he had not received
nis material and decided to call the Contract Management Divi-
sion. The exception had been made. From this point on, once
visibility had been obtained, management attention was directed
at that particular contract, the problem was solved and the
material was received.
The above example of exception management is based on a
real case, one that is not considered unique. The problem is
visibility and dedicated management attention. This particular
aspect will be discussed in the next chapter. The point to
be made, however, is that management by exception, because of
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the paucity of effective methods and tools available to the
procurement manager, has preeminence over all other delin-
quency problem-solving techniques.
The other part of the problem solving formula, available
to the procurement manager, is dedicated item support. The
External Acquisitions/Contract Expedite branch serves this
function. The branch monitors contractor performance on high
interest contracts and conducts expedite/follow-up actions to
ensure timely delivery of contract material. Although the
branch is assigned other expedite/delinquency related tasks,
research reveals that the scope of the response is limited.
Such lofty sounding responsioility assignments as "Analyses,
evaluates and initiates appropriate actions to resolve delin-
quencies utilizing the contractor delinquency output from the
CSR" [Ref. 17] is merely the work of a single GS-5 updating
the CDL. Other delinquency related tasks are performed here
but they are primarily related to specific programs or pro-
jects such as SKIPALTS, Selected Item Review (SIR), or high
level review of stock items for SPCC. Exception management
enters the process here also. Much of the delinquency related
response revolves around requests for action from customers.
Branch personnel tend to work along the lines of item delivery,
where the contractor is late or when delivery has to be moved
up or where the monitoring of progress of an item is desired.
The concept of management that directs attention to specific
variables or sets of variables in the procurement equation
works well for what it is tasked to do. The problem lies in
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the fact that wherever there is a focus of attention, there
is a narrowness of scope. Attention may be dedicated to a
select grouping of items operating around a single variable
such as delivery or price but without sacrificing accuracy
and efficiency, that same attention cannot be applied over
the greater body of items and the full set of variables.
Some other, more enduring technique or set of techniques must
be used.
To summarize, it must be said that management at SPCC
recognizes and is attempting to respond to the problem of
delinquency. The problem has not been masked or hidden but
given the degree of management attention that displays a
strong desire to move toward the most cost-effective, enduring
problem-solving strategy. Response to the problem has been
somewhat muted by the inadequacy of the tools available and
the workload generated inertia that causes the procurement
manager to rely on means and methods other than those he
would no doubt choose to employ. There are, however, other
limits imposed upon the procurement manager's ability to
respond to the delinquency problem, limits that are at once
recognizable and approachable yet difficult to grasp and at
times deeply imbedded in the system itself. With enough
effort and disregard to cost, any given source of management
information can be updated, improved or even developed to
provide the manager with more realistic, accurate and up to
date information. What desire and money may not be able to
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do, however, is remove some of the more system entrenched
impediments to delinquency problem solution. The next section
investigates this particular question.
E. MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS: LIMITATIONS
Perhaps the single greatest limit imposed upon the pro-
curement manager's ability to effectively deal with the delin-
quency problem, is workload. Management must first address
workload when entering into resource allocation decisions,
when determining how to approach problem-solving situations
and when deciding how best to achieve mission objectives.
Chapter II, Section E, illustrated the workload currently faced
by the Contract Management Division. The workload may be
summarized as being composed of:
A) An enormous volume of work to be accomplished as the
result of increasingly complex weapons systems and an ex-
panding Navy.
B) A level of staffing inadequate to provide the degree
of attention necessary to properly perform all work.
C) A substantial diversity in the type of work to be per-
formed, the time frames necessary for proper performance and
the manner in which the work must be accomplished.
These workload characteristics create a form of inertia that
must be dealt with by each individual worker. Rather than
being able to apply a concise, methodical approach to the work
at hand, the worker finds himself constantly responding to
new developments which draw him farther and farther away from
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any form of structured performance. A rather crude but illus-
trative analogy would be to view performance of stock and in-
use item procurement administration as a simple linear
regression. The "true" regression would represent a structured
level of performance characterized by:
A) A prioritized, sequenched approach to existing and in-
coming work that balances the need to complete work in process
with the level of attention that must be applied to incoming
requirements
.
B) A continuous assessment of cognizant procurements con-
sisting of performance, quality and progress updates which
determine the degree of dedicated attention the administrator
must apply to ensure all contract requirements are met (adminis-
trators are currently assigned cases en the basis of level of
difficulty and experience level. Cases are further divided
alphabetically, by contractor name)
.
This type of structured performance would assure the manager
that his workers are processing routine work in the minimum
amount of time allowing for proper analysis and accurate
response. It would mean that higher priority work is provided
for first, but organized in such a way that it is not performed
at the exclusion of all other work. Finally, it would mean
that the administrator, through continuous review and update,
is ahead of potential problems because the process automatically
highlights areas where contract performance is deficient.
Problems such as delinquency would get the amount of visibility
and dedicated attention necessary for its solution.
78

In reality, the process is characterized, almost exclu-
sively, by reactionary response. An enormous volume of highly
diversified work has been imposed upon, what this research
reveals, an inadequately sized staff comprised of a less than
optimum number of senior, more experienced workers. Each
worker is caught up in the inertia of having to respond (react)
to the needs of their cognizant procurements, as they come up.
This reactive process builds upon itself. Each problem, or
action demands the time and attention of the worker. As more
and more actions arise, backlogs begin to dominate and the
workers attention must be divided among a large number cf re-
quirements rather than being dedicated to just a few. To
simply process the work and clear it from one's desk, ail nhe
virtues of good performance (i.e., accuracy, completeness,
comprehensive review and analysis, continuous updating) are
diffused or diluted because they must be applied over a large
spectrum of actions in a relatively short period of time.
Problems are not solved, but instead, are attacked through a
series of very marginal adjustments. It is the essence of
"muddling through."
Instead of residing along the line of true regression,
worker performance may be viewed as a process of continual
response to deviations both above and below the true regression
The deviations take the form of reaction to the unending flow
of incoming requirements or needs, never allowing the worker
to proceed along the optimum path. Therefore the best "fit",
the line that corresponds to the level or nature of worker
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performance necessary to cope with the existing workload,
varies dramatically from that which represents the optimum
approach for delinquency problem solution.
This, then, is the workload generated limiation management
must deal with. The disparity between necessary performance
and actual performance will force the procurement manager to
redefine his delinquency problem-solving strategy and explore
other alternatives that are tailored to take into considera-
tion the capacity and limitations of his workforce. In the
absence of increased staffing and/or reduced workload, this
limitation will persist and the optimum problem-solving strategy
will be beyond the manager's grasp.
A second limitation was discussed in depth, in Section B
of this chapter. The limitation has to do with the inflexi-
bility of public entities in dealing with a changin environ-
ment. It is a rare case when a public entity is granted enough
autonomy to establish its own course of action in dealing with
its environment. The need for oversight of the expenditure
of public funds, has, over the years, created an enormous,
cumbersome array of statutes, policies, regulations, executive
orders, directives, standard operating procedures and the like,
which have, despite their good intent, promoted a devolution
of good business judgment. The procurement manager finds him-
self accountable to the public at large, via statute and so
on, for the promotion of social, political and economic objec-
tives that take precedence over all other business considerations
These objectives, plus the overriding concern for equanimity
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at the expense of good judgment, have served to mitigate the
potency of a great number of remedies available to the procure-
ment, manager. For example, flexibility in source selection
is limited, in the case; of formal advertising, because the
contracting officer is forbidden, in the absence of a deter-
mination of non-responsibility, to award the contract to other
than the low bidder (assuming the bidder is responsive) . The
Comptroller General has ruled that the Contracting officer,
in such cases, must: make award to the lowest responsible bidder
It is quite easy for a small business to overturn a determina-
tion of non-responsibility by applying for a Certificate of
Competency (COC) from ihe Small Business Administration (SBA)
.
Although the SBA assumes responsibility for performance after
the issuance of a COC, it does nothing to mitigate the impact
caused by the contractor's intransigence, if such occurs,
after contract award. Nearly 50% of all SPCC contract awards
(excluding modifications under $10,000) are made to small
businesses, the majority via formal advertising! Similarly,
the contracting officer has little room to maneuver if he
suspects a buy-in. "Should cost" determinations are rarely
made in stock and in-use item procurement. In the absence
of a solid pre-award survey determination that actually can
challenge the contractor on what performance is likely to
cost (the onus is on the Navy to prove the contract cannot be
performed at the quoted price. It can rarely do so without
being heavily challenged by the contractor) the contracting
officer can do little except wait until performance becomes
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delinquent. In addition, the fairness doctrine has given
prospective contractors great leverage in influencing the
source selection process in court or at the General Account-
ing Office. "Contracting Officers seem to have become more
and more conservative because of the ease with which an
unsuccessful offeror can lodge a protest. In response to
this, and in an effort to increase objectivity, source-selection
criteria have become more numerous and detailed, so detailed
in fact, that we may fast be coming to the po:.nt where the
method begins to overshadow the objective" [Ref. 18]. In, A
Report on the Feasibility of Using Liquidated Damages Clauses
and Monetary Incentives in Stock Procurement Contracts , Captain
J.H. Mayer, SC, USNR-R, states that termination proceedings
and a refusal to award based on poor prior performance repre-
sent part of "an effective arsenal of weapons to show that the
Navy wants a stock delivered when promised by the contractor"
[Ref. 19]. This thesis submits that this "arsenal of weapons"
is severely diminished in impact because of the procurement
managers inability to be flexible in choosing the time, place
and manner of their use. One final example will make this
point. Would it be cost effective and beneficial to the Navy
to begin termination proceedings against a sole source con-
tractor who is two months late in delivering, a long lead time
to produce, critically needed item that only a single contractor
makes? If defaulted, how long will it take to reprocure the
item? Who will provide the item the next time? How much will
82

the whole administrative process cost, recognizing that the
average value of a single delinquent contract is just slightly-
above $17,000? Can this be considered an effective weapon?
Other factors which may be said to limit the procurement
managers ability to deal with the delinquency problem are:
A) The dynamic forces of this unique procurement environ-
ment, by their very nature, tend to upset any attempt to in-
still orderliness upon them. Peculiar requirements, spot-
buys, volume inconsistencies, contractor-internal deficiencies
and conflicts of objectives, among others, create dysfunctions
that defy management control and foster problem formulation.
This limitation, along with inflexibility, changing needs and
policies of the sovereign, lack of close contractor relation-
ships, and lack of contractor commitment are system embedded
limitations that are difficult and maybe even impossible to
change. Like workload, management must tailor its problem-
solving strategy to take these limits into consideration.
B) The large number of sole-source requirements effectively
limit the degree of leverage the procurement manager can apply
against delinquent suppliers. Sole source procurement appears
to be a function of the uniqueness of the procurement environ-
ment, primarily because of the type of material required. The
procurement manager can have little effect on this. The "got
to have it now" attitude of most customers places fulfillment
of the need above all other considerations. This affords the
procurement manager little latitude when dealing with the
supplier, especially where delinquency is concerned.
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There are other limitations not discussed in this section.
Some are obvious, some not so. The above discussion, however,
adequately illustrates the plight of the stock and in-use item
procurement manager as he seeks to confront the problem of
delinquency. There appear to be far more limitations imposed
upon his problem-solving efforts, than there are tools or
techniques available to benefit him. It is certainly not
a clear cut, fixed dilemma. As this thesis has repeated over
and over, the process is dynamic and changing. There may at
times be latitude where a moment ago there was none, flexi-
bility where there was once no movement and orderliness where
there was only disorder. In the long run, however, the delin-
quency management environment is filled with limitations that
force the procurement manager to continuously reassess the
situation and tailor his strategy, in light of those limita-
tions, to best meet his end objectives.
F. PERSPECTIVE: THE PROBLEM AND THE ENVIRONMENT, ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED
The Chief of the Contracting Office, in a research inter-
view, noted that the delinquency problem at SPCC was complex
and outwardly deceiving. The accuracy of this statement is
evident from a review of the preceding sections. It is truly
a perplexing problem. To view delinquency as severable from
the characteristics or dynamism of the larger environment
would be a gross error. To try to pin down the problem from
a review of the statistical parameters is equally mistaken.
It would be akin to viewing an iceberg, where the largest and
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most important dimension is hidden from view. There is no
single solution to the problem. In fact, there may be no
solution to it at all. Perhaps the best that can be hoped
for is a greater understanding of all aspects of the problem
which will lead to the development of tools and techniques
that will reduce it to more than just an acceptable level.
If nothing else, this chapter should show that the delin-
quency problem is interwoven into every aspect of the stock
and in-use item procurement process. Some parts of the problem
are firmly entrenched in the very fabric of the process it-
self. These "roots", if they may be called such, may never
be subject to change or if so only very marginally. The
procurement manager's concern, then, should be with approaching
those parts of the problem that are susceptible to change.
Chapter IV provides a discussion of some of the ways this
might be accomplished. The author recognizes the complexity
of the problem and realizes there is no panacea of cures for
it. What is hoped, however, is that a presentation of care-
fully weighed considerations may provide the procurement
manager with a method not yet conceived or of a thought not




IV. ANALYSIS AMD CONSIDERATIONS
A. THE PRE-AWARD PROCESS
If the old adage, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound
of cure, has any merit to it, we must assume that the pre-
award phase of a contract life cycle is, perhaps, the most
important of all. It is during this period of time, when the
rights of the government are whole, that the procurement
manager can exercise the greatest amount of influence over
the future well-being of the particular contrac:. The manager,
during this phase of contract formulation, shouLd be able to
make certain decisions regarding the level of visibility and
manageability the particular requirement will necessitate,
during its life cycle, that will help him monitor and control
contract performance throughout.
Early visibility is the key denominator in the procurement
manager's pre-award decision-making strategy. The manager
must ensure that his contracting officers pay particular
attention to important performance indicators which will pro-
vide some form of insight as to the level of management re-
quired for each particular contract action . Of initial concern
should be the prior purchase history of an item. If prior
procurement has been absent any sort of price competition,
the contracting officer should look deeper to see if there
are other indicators that might point to potential performance
problems and hence delinquency. Previous terminations for
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default or convenience are, of course, very overt indicators
of a troubled past. Other relevant indicators the contracting
officer should be aware of are:
A) Prior contract delinquency problems
B) Past waivers granted (including a review to ascertain
the nature and composition of the requested waivers. In
Chapter III, it was shown that Target Corporation was very
effective at shifting responsibility for deficient performance
onto the government simply by the way they worded their waiver
requests)
.
C) Previous negotiated schedule extensions
D) Prior deviations from specifications requested
There are, in fact, two reasons for exploring and analyzing
such performance indicators. First, past performance is quite
commonly a very accurate measure of future performance. The
contracting officer must, on the basis of the evidence before
him, make a determination as to the level of management atten-
tion required to see the particular contract through to com-
pletion. Second, the contracting officer must make an effort
to assure himself that poor past performance on the part of
a given contractor, was not in fact caused by forces associated
with the adequacy of the government's own procurement per-
formance. Quite often, specification inadequacies or defi-
ciencies, technical data package irregularities and other
requirements package problems continue on from procurement to
procurement, sight unseen, except in the detrimental effects
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imposed on contractor performance. To avoid unnecessary de-
lays, litigation and performance vagaries, the contracting
officer must ensure that the government's requirement is
accurate and concise.
The high level of sole-source requirements at SPCC put a
damper on any sort of market analysis t.nat may be performed
by the contracting officer. Nonetheless, knowledge of the
characteristics of a given, competitive market, presents
very significant insight as to the potential performance of
its participants. Signs of a depressed market with a number
of active competitors should lead the contracting officer to
make contingency plans for a potential "buy- in". A buy-in,
on the part of an undercapitalized, under-financed firm, is a
strong indicator of probable performance failure and therefore,
suggests a high probability of future delinquency.
As noted earlier, 50% of SPCC * s contracts are awarded to
small businesses. Data points to a disproportionate number
of small business performance failures as contrasted to that
of larger firms. It is recognized that small business partici-
pation cannot and should not be curtailed to any great degree,
however, the contracting officer must appraise himself of the
risk of failure attendant with particular small business con-
tracts. Contingency planning, visibility and resource allo-
cation decisions should be tied to the contracting officers




The intent of the above, is to inure in the contracting
officer, a desire to obtain every single bit of performance
relevant data possible. This will allow him to effectively
allocate his management resources (level of attention and
administrative costs considered) so as to provide the highest
degree of visibility possible to potential delinquent contrac-
tors. If poor performance is expected, this knowledge wij.1
enable the contracting officer to set the level of management
attention necessary to adequately monitor and control the
contract through its life cycle. It will allow him to provide
early warning advice to interested program elements, to allow
them to develop contingency plans of their own. Coordination
between these offices will enhance their surveillance capa-
bility and provide for a measure of understanding in the
event of adverse, future contract performance developments.
A valuable extension of the contracting officer's contrac-
tor information gathering capability, is the pre-award survey.
It was established in Chapter III, that SPCC only partial ly
takes advantage of this most useful tool. DCAS was adamant
in its request that more pre-award surveys be performed on
contractors who have shown inconsistency in past performance
or who are suspected of "buying-in". It is recognized, that
in many cases, even though the contractor has exhibited poor
past performance, the small dollar value of the action plus
its attendant minor level of criticality do not warrant the
cost of a pre-award survey. This is a fact of the unique
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procurement environment that must be accepted. Some of these
low dollar value, non-critical requirements, no doubt add to
the delinquency problem. In these cases, the attendant appli-
cation of intensive management, to preclude performance slippage,
is not warranted in the face of the costs associated with
such surveillance. The benefit of committing additional re-
sources to actions such as this, is far outweighed by the costs
of such an endeavor. Of course, lack of management attention
of such a small item, may lead to delinquency, which in turn,
because of its non-availability, causes the item to become
more and more critical on the basis of need. As this happens,
the benefit derived from the utilization of enhanced management
resources more appropriately matches the costs involved in
doing so. This is an SPCC dilemma that is not likely to be
solved.
Although the Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) speci-
fies that a pre-award survey should not be performed on awards
of $25,000 or less, it does provide that a pre-award survey
may be performed on small businesses which may be candidates
for a Certificate of Competency (COC) . Since any small business
award in excess of $10,000 is a potential candidate for a
COC, the DAR leaves at least some room for contracting offi-
cer judgment in weighing cost-effectiveness against the risk
of doing business with a small concern. In many cases, once
received, a pre-award survey may not provide information
strong enough to support a negative responsibility determina-
tion, yet it may provide information that points to probable
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down stream performance problems. In this case, the con-
tracting officer should utilize the information to formulate
a plan to increase the visibility of the contract so that
originating problems may be quickly observed and promptly
dealt with.
Unfortunately, and as mentioned earlier, in Chapter III,
DOD has provided little flexibility to the contracting offi-
cer, when dealing with noted poor performers, in the source
selection process. It is not at all uncommon to find con-
tractors reaping the benefits of new contract awards even
though their earlier performance was basically unsatisfactory.
"The situation is in stark contrast to that of the private
sector, where organizations generally maintain a list of pre-
ferred vendors and suppliers. The 'preferred list 1 is pri-
marily determined by experience from previous contracts and
frequently is the major influence in the determination of
future awards" [Ref. 20]. In DOD procurement, a contractor
must be given the right of due process if the government pre-
vents him from competing for contracts. "Any law that would
abridge a prospective contractor's right to compete, other
than the requirement that he must be responsible, would bring
into question the integrity of the process as it now exists"
[Ref. 21]. Therefore, it is quite unlikely that such measures
as past performance would legally be upheld as a reason not
to award a contract, unless of course the contractor was
found to be non-responsible.
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Absent the leverage and flexibility necessary to deal
with poor performers in the source selection process, the
contracting officer roust seek alternative means to monitor
and control problem contracts through their life cycle.
Duane Knittle and Daniel Carr, in their study entitled,
Detection and Avoidance of Contractor Defaults
,
present a
very interesting system of contract rr.onitoring and control
that appears to have substantial applicat ility to the delin-
quency management problem at SPCC. The primary tool used is
a Contracts Characteristics Matrix, shown in Figure 1.
Criticality indicators, based on a combination of the item's
criticality designator and dollar value, are displayed along
the vertical axis. The horizontal axis reflects the number
of adverse predictive indicators which have been identified
as being associated with the particular procurement. (SPCC
can, no doubt, refine these categories to reflect specific
combinations of indicators which are prevalent in their
particular operations). Predictive indicators, although






D) Past Waivers Requested
As the authors note, assignment of an action to the
appropriate cell of the matrix, will provide a structural


























no adverse predictive indicators
any one adverse predictive indicator
any two adverse predictive indicator:
etc .
Figure 1 . Contract Characteristics Matrix
criticality and predictive indicators suggest an intensive
management effort. Conversely, and in accord with the dis-
cussion in Section D of Chapter III, certain combinations
suggest only exception management. The authors go one step
further, and provide a Management Application Matrix, Figure
2, with cells corresponding to the possible combinations
reflected in the Contract Characteristics Matrix. By locating
the corresponding cell in the Management Application Matrix,
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Further Analysis (a function of
judgment and Resource Availability)
E - Exception Management
Figure 2. Management Application Matrix
A) intensive management should be applied
B) exception management is sufficient
C) further analysis is required
This type of management tool serves as a vehicle for more
systematic workload prioritization. Of course, personnel
restraints may dictate expansion of the standard categories
for exception management. Also, as presented by the authors,
command experience may facilitate greater standardization,
thus reducing the number of "F" cells in the matrix. The
point to be made, with SPCC in mind, is the fact that buyer/
administrator split and workload considered, this is an
exceptional tool designed to help management monitor and
control suspect contracts without extreme administrative
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cost or disruption. Prepared by the contracting officer or
his buyer and passed along to the Contract Management Divi-
sion, this (perhaps) standardized form, prepared for each
procurement action would go a long way toward promoting an
efficient, effective system of contract surveillance, thereby
reducing delinquency through increased visibility and manage-
ment attention. The idea behind such a management approach,
is to minimize administrative burden while maintaining an
acceptable level of performance visibility. A suspense file
should be established by the cognizant administrator, for
each contract, to insure significant performance milestones
are monitored. To conserve resources, only the most signifi-
cant milestones should be monitored. If resources permit,
a second set of milestones should be identified and monitored.
In doing so, the administrator can effectively atune himself
to meaningful performance indicators. Passive indicators,
as noted by the authors, can be defined as the absence of evi-
dence that a performance milestone has been completed (i.e.,
the absence of a DD Form 250 Material Inspection and Receiving
Report) . The receipt of a Delay in Delivery Notice DD FORM
375-2, would be an example of an active indicator of per-
formance difficulties. The administrator's suspense file is
aimed at increasing the administrators sensitivity to passive
indicators. Ideally, SPCC's ADPE system would be the best
source of a real-time suspense file, providing daily or weekly
passive and active indicator input to management. In the
absence of such a svstem, a manual file must suffice. This
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thesis proposes that such a system will provide an efficient,
cost-effective tool for managements use, in the delinquency
problem-solving process. Again, the key concept is visibility
Visibility provides for a heightened awareness of the progress
of a given contract and thereby creates a vehicle for the
application of increased management attention which should,
within reason, mitigate problem effects before they become
unmanageable
.
Notwithstanding the acknowledged impediments of personnel
ceilings and job classifications, time and cost limitations
and the staid nature of a long established work structure, a
case must be presented for the one buyer/administrator concept
There can be no question, that a separation of buyer from
contract, following award, contributes to a lack of overall
commitment to ensure timely, proper performance of all con-
tract requirements. There are innumerable reasons why the
buyer should have full responsibility and accountability for
his contractual actions, from initiation to contract comple-
tion. Many of the reasons were discussed in Chapter III.
Before closing out this section on pre-award considerations,
it would do well to briefly examine this concept once more.
A buyer should have both a strong business and technical
knowledge. He must understand purchasing principles and their
applications as well as have a general understanding of the
business functions involved in and related to procurement. He
must also have a firm grasp of the technical details of
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materials he procures and their manufacturing processes.
Because of his status among suppliers and his intimate knowl-
edge of the contract, the buyer can obtain more effective re-
sults from suppliers than can a person of lesser status in
the organisation. If a buyer is provided full responsibility
for each o:: his contracts, he will make it a point to fully
participate in each phase of the performance cycle. Like-
wise, having full responsibility and accountability for all
his buys makes the job of measurement and control of his per-
formance much easier. In this type of arrangement, as noted
in Chapter III, the buyer has full visibility of outgoing re-
quirements while acquiring status and monitoring performance
of existing contracts. This presents the buyer with a greater
amount of Leverage to employ against intransigent suppliers.
Control and therefore continuity of relationships is main-
tained because there is no gap in the process since the con-
tract is not being transferred from one person to another.
Much can be said for cross-training administrators to even-
tually take over buyer/administrator assignments, thereby
increasing the number of buyers, decreasing the number of
requirements each handles and in the long run providing for
a more responsible, responsive organizational segment. Of
course, much of the routine work must still be performed by
another group, commonly referred to as "expediters" in indus-
try. An effective work structure would be highlighted by
the assignment of a single expediter to each buyer (or buyer
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group) . The expediter would do the work required by his buyer
with the buyer retaining full responsibility and accounta-
bility for his work. This would minimize the division of
responsibility now experienced at 3PCC, put more leverage
and power into the hands of individual buyers and present
the organization with the type of activity-industry interface
that has been so successful in the private sector.
Whatever means are employed, it is a certainty that aggres-
sive contract management in the pre-award phase, is the best
guarantee an organization can have, for satisfactory contract
life cycle performance. Management must be aware to develop,
control and monitoring tools, that not only provide for the
best utilization of scarce personnel resources, but also give
the degree of visibility necessary to selected contracts so
as to ensure an adequate level of management attention is em-
ployed. Finally, an assessment of the current work structure
should be made, to take into consideration the maximization
of benefit that may be gained by applying the one buyer/
administrator concept.
B. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
Often, pre-award management initiatives such as those
discussed above, are not enough to prevent down stream per-
formance irregularities, no matter how aggressively they are
applied. Such irregularities, which manifest themselves in
contractor delinquency, may be ascribed to any number of
factors, including those which were discussed in Chapter III.
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In the private sector, it has been said that individual firms
seek to reconcile the majority of their post-award performance
problems by employing extra contractual methods. These methods
take the form of personal interaction and reliance on well
established, traditional business relationships. These pro-
vide the measure of agreement necessary to correct the problem
at hand, while standing clear of the use of contractual reme-
dies for as long as possible. Two principle reasons preclude
government procurement managers from taking advantage of such
beneficial methods. First, the impersonalization of each
contractual action, created, in part, by the buyer-administrator
split in responsibility, negates all ability to establish
meaningful buyer-supplier relationships. Second, the flexi-
bility inherent in the private sector buyer's ability to "step
outside" the four corners of a contract, to work on matters
of mutual benefit, is absent in the case of government buyers.
Government buyers, contracting officers and agents of any
sort, are imbued with a procedural mind-set which forbids most
effort toward innovation and most definitely confines them to
the four corners of their contract. This is not to say that
government procurement is dominated by "institutional minds,"
because it simply is not so. The point, however, is that
legal, statutory, political, social and other considerations,
force the procurement agent to act predominantly within a
well established "response" structure or suffer the possi-
bility of censure if he ventures outside it. Thus, in
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government procurement, there is a far greater tendency to
rely on intra-contractual remedies to make the Government
whole in the face of contractor intransigence.
There are, of course, many remedies available to the
procurement manager, in the form of contractually established
provisions, which provide so-called "flexibility" throughout




This remedy is employed in the case of fraud, anti-
trust violations or other offenses which raise a question
regarding a firm's business integrity. It may also be used
where a firm violates contractual provisions such as the
Gratuities Clause or it may be used "for any other cause of
such serious or compelling nature affecting responsibility as
a Government contractor as may be determined by the Secretary
of the Department concerned to justify debarment" [Ref . 22]
.
With few exceptions, while a contractor remains on the Debarred
List, he may not be issued a procurement solicitation nor
may he be considered for an award of a prime or subcontract.
Debarment usually is effective for three years.
2. Default
In a fixed price type contract, the government may
terminate all or any portion of a contract if the contractor:
1. Fails to make delivery within the time specified in the
contract
.




3. Fails to perform any other provision of the contract.
Absent excusable delays, the government may repurchase the
required item elsewhere and charge the contractor for excess
costs. Flexibility provided to the procurement manager through
the use of remedies such as the above, is greatly suspect
because of the extreme gravity associated with their employ-
ment. It is generally understood that these are remedies of
last resort. They are used whenever there is simply no other
recourse avaiJable. Default, especially, is of little use for
delinquency solving because it is far too time consuming and
expensive a process to enter into, and it does not provide
for expeditious receipt of required material. Default pro-
ceedings are usually begun well into the production cycle
of the product. Re procurement simply adds onto the already
lost production lead time the material has experienced. Thus,
even in the face of extreme contractor deficiency, it is not
likely that default would be used, if the item was critically
needed and expeditious recovery was paramount.
Other remedies such as:
A) Public Law 87-653 (Truth in Negotiations Act)
B) Warranties and Inspection
C) Changes and Modifications
* D) Stop Work
are classified by reference to the activity to which they
relate. Although effective in their own realm of considera-
tion, they have little impact on the problem of delinquency.
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What remedy, then, is available to the government,
that mitigates the need for extensive, all encompassing solu-
tions as provided by the default provision, yet is effective
enough to dissuade prospective contractors from de-emphasizing
their government contractual commitments? This thesis pro-
poses that the use of liquidated damages provides such a
remedy.
The government has a right to claim damages on breach




Where there has been no agreement between the parties and no
court determination has been made, the damages are said to
be not determined in amount , hence unliquidated (the term
"liquidate" means to determine by agreement or by litigation
the precise amount of indebtedness, damages or accounts)
.
Unliquidated damages come to the fore when there is failure
on the part of the contractor, to live up to his contractual
commitments, and some form of harm to the government results.
The damages essentially flow from the breach and are "measured
by the amount of money necessary to make the government whole"
[Ref. 23]. This type of damage provision is not preferred
because of the extreme difficulty associated with attempting
to fix the amount of damages entailed, after the breach.
Liquidated damages, on the other hand, are pre-set in
amount by mutual agreement of the parties. They take the form
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of clauses incorporated in contracts, which provide that in
the event of the occurrence of a specified performance defi-
ciency (such as delinquency), the contingencies in the clause
will become active. The courts, in general, while vocifer-
ously expounding their intense dislike for "penalty" provi-
sions, have been receptive to the use of liquidated damages
as a form of resolution of disputes. The first question asked
by the courts has to do with what elements were used in the
two party determination of the original damage figure. They
are very interested in whether or not the parties were reason-
able. If they determine that the liquidated damages provisions
serve to do no more than penalize the contractor rather than
compensate the government for actual damage anticipated, they
will consider the clause or provision unenforceable.
The DAR clause dealing with liquidated damages, as
applicable to supply contracts is as follows:
7-105.5 Liquidated Damages. In accordance with 1-310, where
a liquidated damages provision is to be used in a supply con-
tract, the following provision shall be inserted as paragraph
(f) of the Default clause (7-103.11) and the present para-
graphs (f) and (g) of that clause shall be redesignated "g"
and "h".
(f) If the Contractor fails to deliver the supplies
or perform the services within the time specified in this
contract, or any extension thereof, the actual damage
to the Government for the delay will be difficult or im-
possible to determine. Therefore in lieu of actual
damages the Contractor shall pay to the Government as
fixed, agreed, and liquidated damages for each calendar
day of delay, the amount set forth elsewhere in this
contract. Alternatively, the Government may terminate
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this contract in whole or in part as provided in paragraph
(a) of this clause, and in that event the Contractor shall
be liable, in addition to the excess costs provided in
paragraph (b) above, for such liquidated damages accruing
until such time as the Government may reasonably obtain
delivery or performance of similar supplies or services.
The Contractor shall not be charged with liquidated
damages when the delay arises out of causes beyond the
control and without the fault or negligence of the Con-
tractor, as defined in paragraph (c) above, and in such
event, subject to the "Disputes" clause, the Contracting
Officer shall ascertain the facts and extent of the delay
and shall extend the time for performance of the contract
when in his judgment the findings of fact justify an
extension
.
DAR 1-310 states that liquidated damages provisions may be
used when both :
1) the time of delivery or performance is such an important
factor that the government may reasonably expect to suffer
damages if the delivery or performance is delinquent, and
2) the extent or amount of such damages would be difficult
or impossible of ascertainment or proof. In addition, DAR
1-310 states:
(b) When a liquidated damages clause is used, the con-
tract shall set forth the amount which is to be assessed
against the contractor for each calendar day of delay. The
rate of assessment of liquidated damages must be reasonable
considered in the light of procurement requirements on a
case-by-case basis, since liquidated damages fixed without
reference to probable actual damages may be held to be a
penalty and therefore unenforceable. If appropriate
to reflect the probable damages, considering that the
Government can terminate for default or take other appro-
priate action, the rate of assessment of liquidated damages
may be in two or more increments which provide a declining
rate of assessment as the delinquency continues. The con-
tract may also include an overall maximum dollar amount or
period of time, or both, during which liquidated damages
may be assessed, to assure that the result is not an un-
reasonable assessment of liquidated damages.
(c) The law imposes the duty upon a party injured by
another to mitigate the damages which result from such
wrongful action. Therefore, where a liquidated damages
provision is included in a contract and a basis for
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termination for default exists, appropriate action should
be taken expeditiously by the Government to obtain per-
formance by the contractor or to terminate the contract.
If delivery or performance is desired after termination
for default, efforts must be made to obtain either delivery
or performance elsewhere within a reasonable time. For
these reasons, particularly close administration over con-
tracts containing liquidated damages provisions is
imperative.
(D) Whenever any contract includes a provision for
liquidated damages for delay the Comptroller General on
the recommendation of the Secretary concerned is authorized
and empowered to remit the whole or any part of such
damages as in his discretion may be just and equitable.
Accordingly, recommendations concerning such remissions
may be transmitted co the Secretary concerned in accordance
with Departmental procedures.
Captain J.H. Mayer, SC, USNR-R, in his study of liqui-
dated damages, referred to earlier, in Chapter III, noted that
there are deep reservations on the part of legal personnel
and contract administrators as to the effectiveness of liqui-
dated damages. Legal personnel feel such provisions are
generally unenforceable and administrative personnel believe
they will be unable to act on a case by case basis to reason-
ably estimate damages and monitor the contract. Captain Mayer
ascribes a great part of this disaffection as being attributa-
ble to the restrictions placed on the use of liquidated
damages by the provisions of DAR 1-310 above. A contractor,
Captain Mayer notes, could cite DAR 1-310 when fighting the
enforcement of liquidated damages while arguing:
1) The time of delivery of stock is not such an important
factor that it is reasonable to expect that the Navy will
suffer damages if a delivery is late.
Arguments and answers extracted from: Report on the
Feasibility of Using Liquidated Damages Clauses and Monetary




2) If damages do occur on a rare occasion, the extent or
amount can be ascertained at the time of breach.
3) The rate to be assessed as damages must be established
on a case-by-case basis, not by type or category of contract;
otherwise it is an unenforceable penalty.
4) The Navy should have considered that the contract could
be terminated for default or other appropriate action such as
a negotiated reduction in price could be used.
5) The contract should have a maximum amount of liquidated
damages
.
6) The Navy has a duty to mitigate damages. It must act
quickly to obtain performance or terminate rather than allow-
ing liquidated damages to occur or increase. Close adminis-
tration is "imperative" and wasn't done.
7) Finally, equitable grounds for relief exist because of
delays caused by the Navy, inaccurate contract specifications,
etc., which warrant the Comptroller General's remitting all
or a portion of the damages.
Captain Mayer proposed that there were, in fact,
answers to these arguments and that, in appropriate circum-
stances, there should be no reluctance on the* part of legal
or administrative personnel to use and enforce a liquidated
damages clause:
1) Damages are usually incurred as a result of added
administrative expenses and the need to issue spot procurement
contracts. Furthermore, there is frequently a detrimental
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effect on, or threat to, the operational readiness of military
units which should be sufficient to meet argument #1.
2) It is very difficult to ascertain damages under govern-
ment contracts. Of interest is the following quote on page
1716 of Volume II of Federal Procurement Law (FPL) , taken from
the landmark Priebe case:
Today the law does not look with disfavor upon 'liqui-
dated damages* provisions in contracts. When they are
fair and reasonable attempts to fix just compensation for
anticipated loss caused by breach of contract, they are
enfored. . . .They serve a particularly useful function when
damages are uncertain in nature or amount or are unmeasur-
able, as is the case in many government contracts ... .And
the fact the damages suffered are shown to be less than
the damages contracted for is not fatal. These provisions
are to be judged as of the time of making the contract.
3) The regulations do not require a tailor-made clause for
each individual contract. The amount must simply be reason-
able for the particular agreement at the time it is made (see
the quote from the Young case on page 1719 of FPL)
.
4) Frequently, a termination for default is an inadequate
remedy because the production time would have to start over
again leading to longer delays . Liquidated damages are de-
signed to avoid lengthy renegotiation and litigation.
5) A maximum amount of liquidated damages can be inserted
in the contract.
6) A demand for prompt performance should be made to the
contractor. As noted in #4, termination is frequently not
feasible except in extreme cases.
7) Delays caused by the Navy relieve payments for some
days but not for those days resulting from the contractor's
failure to perform (see FPL page 1715).
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Captain Mayer, in his excellent study, along with
other individuals who have performed work on this subject,
is quick to point out that there are indeed, disadvantages,
associated with the use of liquidated damages. Some of the
major disadvantages are:
A) If actual damages prove to be greater than previously
agreed upon liquidated damages, the Government may not recover
its actual damages.
B) There is a "cost" associated with the use of liquidated
damages because many contractors feel they must protect them-
selves from the risk of having to reduce final price as the
result of late delivery, when fault for such may be difficult
to determine.
C) An increased administrative burden because of the need
to carefully estimate damage and monitor each contractor's
progress.
D) Increased litigation, taxing the limit of the govern-
ment's legal resources.
The disadvantages, nevertheless, are outweighed by the benefit
of having contractual leverage where once there was none.
Liquidated damages provide the procurement manager with an
effective tool that can be used to protect the government
against failure of a contractor to prosecute the work dili-
gently to completion.
As a result of a study performed by the California
Law Revision Commission, in 1972, Section 1671 of the California
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Civil Code, was, as shown by Captain Mayer, amended in 19 78
to provide that:
...a provision in a contract liquidating the damages
for the breach of the contract is valid unless the party
seeking to invalidate the provision establishes that the
provision was unreasonable under the circumstances
existing at the time the contract was made.
Captain Mayer has proposed that DAR 1-310 be revised to closely
conform to this simple yet flexible and powerful provision.
The scope of this thesis does not permit an in-depth study cf
this proposal, yet the merits associated with such a revision
are clear and convincing. Whether or not revision is made
to DAR 1-310, however, it stands evident that there is a tool
available to the procurement manager, that at least provides;
for some semblance of flexibility when dealing with risk asso-
ciated with contract performance. The use of liquidated
damages should not be considered an end in itself., because
used alone it will be of only partial help in dealing with
delinquency and other performance deficiencies.
A management strategy is needed that incorporates
the enhanced visibility, monitoring and control discussed in
Section A, with the increased incorporation of liquidated
damages provisions in stock and in-use item contracts. Nego-
tiating liquidated damages provisions into a contract after
award, although helpful in some respects, negates to a great
extent, the preventative benefits obtained in pre-award
incorporation of the provision. Management must seek to target
those requirements, which after careful analysis (i.e.,
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Figures 1 and 2) are considered high risk ventures (from the
standpoint of probable contractor delinquency) and therefore
most suitable for the incorporation of liquidated damages
provisions. Liquidated damages should serve, not as penalty
provisions used to blundgeon erratic performers, but as a
form of negative incentive used to communicate to potential
delinquent contractors, the contracting officer's firm intent
to abide by the terms and conditions of the contract and
have the contractor likewise comply.
In summary, it would do well to present the opinion
tendered by the courts in Sun Printing and Publishing Associa-
tion V. Moore, 183 U.S. 642, 699. The opinion should convince
the procurement manager of the increasing acceptance of the
use of liquidated damages and should stimulate from him a
more responsive effort toward their use as a tool to help
reduce stock and in-use item contract delinquency. The
opinion reads, "The courts at one time seemed to be quite
strong in their views and would scarcely admit that there
ever was a valid contract providing for liquidated damages.
Their tendency was to construe the language as a penalty, so
that nothing but the actual damages sustained by the party
aggrieved could be recovered. Subsequently the courts became
more tolerant of such provisions, and have now become strongly
inclined to allow parties to make their own contracts, and
to carry out their intentions, even when it would result in
the recovery of an amount stated as liquidated damages, upon
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proof of the violation of the contract, and without proof of
the damages actually sustained."
C. INCENTIVE CONSIDERATIONS
Where discretion exists within the four corners of a
Government contract, it is likely to be exercised. "The
Department of Cefense attempts to secure performance by writing
contracts that limit a contractor's discretion in the acqui-
sition process. Thus, if the contractor had limited discre-
tion with regard to cost and final performance but more
discretion concerning the delivery date, the DOD contracting
officer might add a deliver date incentive to encourage early
delivery.
"
The profit goal is considered by DOD, to be the prime
motivating force behind contractor performance. DAR states:
Profit generally is the basic motive of business
enterprise. .. .The objective should be to insure that
outstandingly effective and economic performance is met
with high profits, mediocre performance with mediocre ,
profits and poor performance by low profits to losses.
This means that DOD expects the profit objective to motivate
a particular contractor to complete his contract in a manner
that is beneficial to the government. Although this regula-
tory guidance stresses the profit motive, few serious researchers
have unequivocally supported the use of incentives to achieve
expected goals. There appears to be a great diversity of
opinion as to what actually motivates contractor performance
Defense Acquisition Regulation; p. 3-22.
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and therefore should be used as the most effective intra-
contractual incentive:
A) Peck and Sherer in, The Weapons Acquisition Process:
An Economic Analysis , state, "It is generally assumed that a
major objective of contractors is to maximize profits, pre-
sumably by maximizing the price stated in a contract, and
that these profit-maximization efforts conflict with the
government's goal of minimizing weapons cost.
B) Robert N. Anthony in, The Trouble with Profit Maximiza-
tions , differs with the above slightly by noting that managers
tend to strive for satisfactory rather than maximum profit.
This is because profit maximization is extremely difficult
to achieve in practice and is sometimes immoral as well.
C) Machlup, in, Theories of the Fir:n: Marginalist,
Behavioral, Managerial , concluded that, "Maximization of
money profits is certainly the simplest objective function,
but it works only in the case of firms exposed to vigorous
competition.
"
D) Gordon Donaldson, in, Financial Goals: Management vs.
Stockholders , believed that managers as a whole aspired toward
continuity and growth, not to profit maximization. He con-
sidered the continuity of the firm and the manager's own job
to be most important to the individual decision maker.
Opinion excerpts taken from: Theory of Incentive
Contracting; Demong and Strayer, pages 42-51, Defense Manage -
ment Journal, First Quarter 1981.
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E) Baumol, in, Business Behavior, Value and Grow th, sug-
gested that the firm's primary objective is the maximization
of sales, or the rate of growth of sales.
F) Robin Marris, in, The Economic Theory of "Managerial"
Capitalism , theorizes that firms will attempt to maximize
the growth rate of the demand for the firm's products and of
the firm's productive capacity.
Demong and Strayer themselves point to several factors that
can be significant contractor motivators. These include:
A) growth
B) new product lines
C) prestige
D) improved public image
E) social approval
F) national goals





L) excelling for the sake of excellence
M) increased profits on other contracts through shared
overhead.
The research clearly shows that there are many schools of
thought related to the question of what motivates contractor
performance. More and more, researchers are convinced that
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there are a great number of motivational factors that challenge
the long standing DOD belief in the theory of the effective-
ness of incentives based on profit maximization. What this
boils down to, is the necessity for intensive analysis of
each and every contractual action, to determine the best
possible incentive vehicle. Management must be intimately
familiar with the contractor, his organization and the
internal desires of corporate individuals such as the major
project managers, to be able to select the optimum incentive
structure. How does this relate to solving the delinquency
problem in the procurement of stock and in-use items?
First, contract cost structures and historical cost growth
scenarios associated with the high visibility of major sys-
tems acquisitions, are principally absent from the world of
stock procurement. The fundamental need for motivational
instruments aimed at providing incremental or percentage re-
turn to major system contractors, based on complex criteria
such as cost or quality control, is evident based on the need
to satisfy a demanding public. The cost of incentives even
becomes a major consideration in the total "program" cost
picture for budgetary purposes. There is no such considera-
tion in stock procurements.
Second, the intensive resources required to support the
determination of what particular incentives are required, on
a case-by-case basis, are not available, to the stock and
in-use item procurement managers.
114

Third, and most important, is the philosophical basis for
using incentive provisions. In complex, high risk system
acquisitions, the use of incentives seems appropriate, as
summed up in the DOD Incentive Contracting Guide: "Incentive
contracts utilize the drive for financial gain under risk
conditions by rewarding the contractor through increased
profit for attaining cost (and sometimes performance and
schedule) levels more beneficial for the government than ex-
pected (target) and by penalizing him through reduced profit
for less than (target) expected levels." In stock and in-use
item procurement, however, absent the high risk and complexity
of enormous systems programs, there should be a strong resis-
tance to paying a bonus to a contractor for delivering material
on time as he. premised to do, as part and parcel of obtaining
the award. This thesis proposes that, in the absence of
"extremis", where critically needed spares are experiencing
dangerously low stock levels, or in other grave "need" situa-
tions, the use of monetary incentives to encourage prompt
delivery and discourage contractor delinquency, should be
strictly avoided.. The risk involved does not lend itself to
the employment of incentives. There is no extreme cost or
uncertainty burden levied upon stock suppliers, nor is there
the enormous engineering and technical uncertainty dimension
experienced by major systems contractors. In major systems
programs, incentives usually are associated with variable
elements such as cost control and value engineering or quality
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assurance, and not with concrete elements such as delivery.
The law has not established a vehicle that demands a bonus
for the reasonable completion of all contract requirements yet
it recognizes performance to be a duty and does in fact give
remedy to the injured party when the promise to perform is
breached. A contractor must not be rewarded for doing no
more than keeping a promise which, by law, was his duty.
D. POST AWARD MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
Satisfactory performance on a government contract is the
result of adequate planning, monitoring and control, on the
part of the contractor and the government. This process
begins in the pre-award phase and no doubt follows the path
(proper or not) set for it there, throughout the entire life
cycle of the contract. Successful implementation of an effi-
cient, cohesive, planning, monitoring and control system at
the outset, greatly facilitates the job of post-award product-
tion and progress surveillance. Section A of this chapter
endeavored to present an approach designed to provide for
effective contract life cycle planning, monitoring and con-
trol, beginning at the earliest stages of the pre-award
process, and carrying over into the post-award administrative
realm. The intent of such an approach is to facilitate con-
tract administrator efforts to:
A) Analyze contract terms and specification requirements,
to ensure adequacy and the contractor's ability to meet them.
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B) Review and evaluate the contractor's production plan,
in terms of in-house capabilities and potential performance
risks
.
C) Monitor the progress being made against the contractor's
predetermined production plan and its relation to meeting
contractual schedules (passive/active indicators)
.
D) Recommend or take corrective measures, if appropriate,
to improve the current manufacturing situation if potential
or actual delays are seen to exist or where progress is not
being made commensurate with contract or program requirements.
An internal control system alone, however, is not suffi-
cient enough to ensure that the administrator receives the
most accurate, up to date information on contractor production
progress. What is needed, is an on-going, communicative,
cooperative relationship between the in-house SPCC contract
administrator and the on-site DCAS industrial specialist.
It is noted that on many occasions, such a relationship does
not currently exist. Interviewees were split on their per-
ception of DCAS personnel as partners in the contract adminis-
tration process. Half felt information provided by their
DCAS counterpart was often too late and far too "skimpy" to
be of any reasonable use to them. They equated this with a
lack of dedication and competence on the part of the DCAS
administrator. The other half, remarkably, stated that DCAS
usually provided "too much" information. The common response
seemed to be "Don't they realize we're far too busy to weed
through all of this data?" While the author feels there is
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merit to both points of view, based on a review of DCAS
generated correspondence, it likewise appears obvious that
the reality of the situation lies somewhere in the middle.
It appears that most of the DCAS data is in fact timely
(although some pointed exceptions will be shown below) and
accurate. Unfortunately, the poorer reports tend to drag
the good ones down with them, at least in the eyes of many
SPCC contract administrators.
DCAS, likewise, is not absent its criticism of SPCC's
contract administrators. The prepondernace of contracts whose
performance deficiency is traceable to a lack of a pre-award
survey, has not escaped their attention. Much of the corres-
pondence regarding delinquent contractors, reviewed by the
author, illustrated DCAS' concern over a reticence on the
part of SPCC to perform pre-award surveys (see Chapter IV,
Section A, for a detailed discussion) . Of course, pre-award
surveys are the buyers responsibility, not the administrator's
Nonetheless, like the bad DCAS data that spoils the good, many
DCAS personnel perceive SPCC as a "whole" when assessing compe-
tence and commitment. The Feltes report, discussed in Chapter
III, illustrates another common DCAS perception. It is held
that SPCC routinely accepts contractor requests for waiver
or modification of test or specification data, for the con-
tractors own convenience in manufacture. It is felt that
SPCC is lax in pointing out the inadequacies of such contrac-
tor requests, when they exist. Additionally, it is believed
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that SPCC takes an inordinately long time to respond to con-
tractor requests, thereby allowing the contractor to allege
government delay ar.d receive a no cost delivery extension.
These problems do exist, but as exceptions rather than the
rule. One tends tc focus on the exceptions, however, and
that is why there is a prevailing misunderstanding between
SPCC and DCAS
.
The root of the; problem lies in perception, not fact. The
vehicle for divergence of viewpoints is lack of understanding
and communication. Delinquency flourishes where there is a
breakdown of effective management surveillance and control
.
This breakdown occurs because there is frequently a lack of
communication and coordination between DCAS and SPCC. This
problem must be corrected before a successful problem-solving
strategy can be developed.
There must be a continuing relationship between SPCC and
DCAS in the pre-award and administration phases. It is DCAS'
job to keep the PCO (in this case the Contract Management
Division administrator) advised of contract status and potential
major problem areas. Similarly, the PCO must keep DCAS ad-
vised of all production related matters which emanate from
the cognizant material manager. The DCAS industrial specialist
is the contract administrator's most important tool in the
monitoring and control process. The industrial specialist
has the physical proximity to the contractor that the SPCC
administrator lacks. The industrial soecialist serves the
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administrator by analyzing the contractor's production facility
capabilities and production management techniques and by
making applicable recommendations for improvements or correc-
tions of deficiencies. "Industrial specialists evaluate
contractor's performance on contracts as tc compliance with
terms and requirements relative to delivery and all related
production functions" [Ref. 24]. It is the industrial special-
ist's responsibility to coordinate with SPCC contract adminis-
trators while executing his assigned contrc.ct production
administration function. By working together, the industrial
specialist and the contract administrator will be able to
identify early warning signs that may point to potential
delinquency, and thus work to prevent the problem before it
occurs. It is no doubt a fact, that successful completion of
a contract is better attained by preventative action rather
than "after the fact" expediting, which is currently the case.
By working together to dispel common perceptions and open
up a more cooperative, informative relationship, the contract
administrator and his on-site industrial specialist will be
able to substantially affect the outcome of all contracts to
which they are a part.
Without the advantages of an automated control and moni-
toring system, the contract administrator must rely heavily
on progress data supplied by his DCAS representative. This
data may be obtained from many sources. It may be obtained
from production progress conferences held by the contract
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administration office, from industrial specialists at the
work site or from periodic progress reports by the contractor
to the ACO or PCO . There is a dual responsibility associated
with the submission and review of the various progress reports.
First, the DCAS representative must endeavor to objectively
and realistically provide progress data "before" actual sched-
ule milestone slippage. Such has not always been the case,
based on a review of the Production Progress Reports, DD
FORMS 1654, forwarded to SPCC . This valuable source of infor-
mation is often forwarded too late to have any preventative
value. Additionally the "carte blanche" approach to recommen-
dations which come in the form of "leave delinquent," is of
little value to the administrator. This progress report is
especially useful as an aid to allow the contract administrator
to increase the level of visibility and hence the level of
management attention necessary, based on the report's conclu-
sions. If the report is not timely, that is, not preventative
or anticipatory in nature, the process then becomes one of
exception management and expediting. The contract adminis-
trator, on the other hand, must learn to pay more attention
to the progress or status reports provided by DCAS as control
tools and put less emphasis on waiting for the phone to ring.
The status reports should be integrated into the overall life
cycle management plan the administrator should have for all
of his contracts (see Chapter IV, Section A) . Given the large
workload faced by each administrator, it would be a mistake
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to conclude that the worker will have instant recall of each
pre-determined, review milestone under each contract he holds
However, if a milestone suspense system for active/passive
indicators, such as that referred to in Section A, is being
kept, the administrator will have the dedicated memory capa-
bility necessary to keep tabs on contractor performance.
The administrator, working with the buyer and a cognizant
DCAS representative, should, during the pre-award phase, iden-
tify key performance milestones in contracts where life cycle
performance is felt to be at some risk. Both contractor and
Government milestones should be included. With designated
milestones in hand, the contract administrator must establish
a milestone suspense file that will be used to track the con-
tract through to completion. As noted earlier, passive and
active performance indicators will form the major input for
suspense file upgrading. It is proposed here, that if DCAS
properly and accurately provides timely status or progress
information, and if SPCC places more emphasis on these re-
ports, there will be a system in place that will effectively
deal with contractor delinquency before it gets out of hand.
Passive indicators such as the absence of a first article
DD FORM 250, would key the administrator to begin reviewing
the impacted contract suspense file to determine what the
problem is. More important, however, are the active indica-
tors of adverse or potentially adverse performance. Some




A) Lack of Physical Progress
- adverse contractor progress reports (DD FORM 375)
adverse DCAS progress reports (DD FORM 1654)
requests for delivery extensions
B) Technical Difficulties
requests for waiver/deviations
adverse DCAS technical reports
C) Financial Problems
requests for upward price adjustments
requests for revised payment provisions
ACO reports of adverse developments
bank assignments
Review of incoming adverse performance indicators should
cause the administrator to update his milestone suspense file
and make an assessment of the problem's potential impact on
downstream performance. If, after an analysis of all avail-
able information, the administrator feels performance is in
jeopardy, he should increase the level of management visibility
currently applied to the contract and seek to apply correc-
tive measures before reaching "extremis". The process entails
a higher level of SPCC/DCAS coordination and understanding
than is now the case. Also, administrators should take a
more active role in constructively establishing improved
monitoring and control habits such as those discussed above.
It is recognized that the current staff available to deal
with the delinquency problem is not likely to increase
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dramatically in the near future. Likewise, it is not antici-
pated that the existing workload will diminish within the
same time period. Management, then, is faced with the age-
old problem of having to do a job that is larger than the
resources on hand to accomplish it. The foregoing discussion
presents alternatives that are considered feasible, yet, per-
haps very difficult to implement under the current condition.
It is hoped that some benefit may be derived, however, by an
examination of such alternatives and the possibilities they




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1
. Conclusion--Delinquency on the part of Navy contrac-
tors plays a key role in exacerbating the shortage of repair
parts needed to support the fleet. Nearly one-quarter of
all stock and in-use item contracts can be classified as
delinquent. SPCC, in its role as a weapons system life cycle
manager, faces a complex, deceiving, yet very real delinquency
problem. SPCC's ability to ensure that 85% of all requests
for stock items can be immediately satisfied from on-hand
resources, appears to be severely tasked because of this prob-
lem. Unlike systems acquisition or commodity procurement,
delinquency in the procurement of stock and in-use items
impacts real-time fleet operational readiness. Like scarce
mineral resources are to national defense, delinquency may-
be the "Achilles Heel" of the Navy's operational integrity.
Recommendation—Defense Secretary Weinberger and former
Deputy Secretary Carlucci, established an objective to balance
the real increases in defense expenditures between force
modernization and improved logistics support. It was recog-
nized that logistics considerations had taken a back seat to
system "end-item" considerations, for too long. Two goals of
significance, if achieved, would greatly enhance the Navy's
ability to deal with delinquency because visibility would be
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established and more money would be applied, in the budget,
to purely logistics considerations. The goals are:
1) To set weapons system readiness objectives. This would
put the readiness objective on par with the more traditional
management priorities of cost, schedule and performance.
2) To provide meaningful post-production support. The
ideal would be to require the military services to budget
for and establish effective post-production support plans
for those weapons systems going out of production.
What is needed is increased visibility of the delinquency
problem facing major logistics managers. Now is the time
for logisticians to call for additional resources that would
allow them to achieve substantial gains in the capability to
maintain ready forces by employing effective delinquency
problem-solving strategies.
2. Conclusion—The delinquency problem at SPCC is a
function of the dynamism of the particular type of procurement
involved and the fact that SPCC operates as a public entity.
The interplay of unique, stock and in-use item procurement
environment characteristics, creates a dichotomy of conflict-
ing goals, objectives, needs and desires experienced between
the customer, SPCC, and its suppliers. This dichotomy mani-
fests itself in an overall lack of contractor commitment to
meet contractual requirements. Likewise, the operation of
SPCC, as a public entity, fosters an inability to respond with
any substantial degree of flexibility, to changing conditions.
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The absence of traditional business relationships, the high
level of public accountability and the dependence of the
process on the changing needs of the sovereign, are all ele-
ments of this concept.
Recommendation--There are elements of the delinquency
problem that are firmly ingrained in the fabric of the proc-
ess. SPCC does not have the resources required to attempt
to restructure the process to reduce its dependence on dynamic
variances nor does it have the authority to change the basic
way it does business wi.th its suppliers. SPCC must recognize
and isolate overt elements of the procurement process that
provides a vehicle for delinquency problem formulation, while
accepting those factors in the process that are essentially
intangible and not subject to management intervention. SPCC
should seek, through a process of illustration and education,
to convince responsible elements in the chain of command,
that the stock and in-use item procurement environment is
unique and warrants special attention. SPCC should strive
to obtain authority to exercise a greater degree of flexi-
bility in dealing with its suppliers, especially in the
source selection process.
3. Conclusion -—SPCC faces an enormous and diverse work-
load that impedes management's ability to effectively isolate
and deal with the delinqeuncy problem. The inertia of such a
workload forces workers to "react" to problems as they come
up rather than rely on a well-structured, prioritized approach
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to their work. This continuous "fire-fighting" hampers
management in its attempt to organize the workforce to direct
their attention to specific problems such as delinquency.
Recommendations --Three alternatives are proposed:
A) The obvious, and perhaps most difficult, is to request
higher personnel ceiling points and a greater number of in-
house available billets for buyers and administrators. This
would effectively reduce the per person case load by dividing
the number of cases among a greater population Df workers,
thereby enhancing management's ability to promote change in
case management.
B) Cross-train contract administrators to take over buyer
responsibilities (the problem with this is the personnel job
classification structure) . Buyers would be responsible for
their contract requirements from cradle to grave. There would
be a greater degree of accountability and commitment on the
part of buyers, trade (business) relationships could be estab-
lished and promoted and a greater amount of leverage would
be placed in the buyers hands.
C) Require buyers and administrators to develop a contract
performance and milestone management system (see Chapter IV,
Sections A and D) that will add the necessary amount of struc-
ture and organization to their workload, to ensure adequate
visibility is maintained over all cognizant contracts, especially
those considered to be potential delinquents.
4. Conclusion—Statistics point to the fact that the
characteristics of the delinquency problem are anything but
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clear cut. Management, thus, has a difficult task in deciding
where and when to apply its scarce resources to engage in
delinquency problem-solving activity. Delinquent contracts
vary in value from $5.00 to over $1 million. Some contrac-
tors have numerous SPCC cognizant contracts with perhaps a
single delinquency while others have each and every one of
their contracts in a delinquent status.
Recommendation --Management must become well acquainted
with the more "overt" characteristics of the delinquency prob-
lem, characteristics that will provide it with an idea of
which avenue to choose to obtain the most cost-effective
solution to the problem. The prevailing philosophy should be
to minimize administrative burden while maintaining an accepta-
ble level of visibility over these characteristics. Limited
personnel resources must be prioritized in the application
of post-award surveillance of potentially delinquent con-
tracts characterized by the appearance of "overt" deficient
performance indicators.
5 . Conclusion—Pre-award surveys are not being used as
a tool to aid the contracting officer in a determination of
the acceptability of prospective contractors. DCAS generated
correspondence relating to deficient peformers, implores the
contracting officer to utilize this vehicle to gain insight
into overall performance characteristics of the contractor
which may impact downstream contract solvency.
Recommendation --Early visibility is the key denomina-
tor in the contracting officer's pre-award decision-making
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strategy. The DAR leaves room for contracting officer judg-
ment in weighing the cost-effectiveness of having a pre-award
survey performed against the risk of possible future contract
performance difficulties, especially in the case of a small
business where the use of a pre-award survey may be justified
all the way down to $10,000. The pre-award survey is a tool
available to the contracting officer which allows him to
gather as much information as possible on a contractor's
ability to meet contract requirements. It is essential that
this tool be used whenever feasible so that a data base of
predictive performance indicators may be established, so as
to allow for contract life cycle performance monitoring.
6. Conclusion--The source selection process, as it exists,
leaves the procurement manager little discretion (except in
the case of a determination of non-responsibility) over
which contractor will eventually receive the award. This
inflexibility fuels delinquency by replacing the exercise of
sound business judgment with external (social, economic,
political) considerations.
Recommendation—The contracting officer, absent the
leverage and flexibility necessary to deal with suspect per-
formers, in the source selection process, must develop a
workable performance monitoring system (see Chapter IV, Section
A) . The primary goal will be to obtain predictive indicators
of probable performance. The performance indicators will be
used to key the contracting officer to the level of visibility
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necessary to ensure the contract gets the requisite amount
of management attention. A suspense file will be maintained,
by cognizant contract administrators, that details specific
performance milestones in the contract life cycle. The per-
formance indicators will dictate the level of attention
necessary, on the part of the administrator, that must be
applied to the milestone chart in addition to the degree to
which passive/active post-award performance indicators must
be monitored.
7. Cone 1 us ion--Delinquency status tools such as the CDL
and CEL are not sufficient enough to provide the procurement
manager with accurate, conprehensive, up-to-date information.
The CDL is infrequently updated and highly susceptible to
error. The CEL, although a superior tool in its own right,
is too narrow in scope to allow for the type of information
on delinquent status needed by the procurement manager.
Recommendation—The procurement manager should have a
procurement dedicated, automated, management reporting sys-
tem, which includes up-to-date data on contractor delinquency.
A computer should provide reports on such things as per-
formance of individual firms in the form of an index which
is up-dated and provided each month. Other valuable informa-
tion would include: contractor volume of business, rejected
shipments, late deliveries (segregated by fault) and more. An
automated contract administrator milestone suspense file sys-
tem (see Chapter IV, Section D) would be optimal. Such a
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system would continuously update the milestone chart and
provide real-time data to the administrator tc allow for a




Conclusion--SPCC needs a contractual vehicle that
mitigates the need for extensive, all-encompassing remedies
such as Default, yet is effective enough to dissuade prospec-
tive contractors from de-emphasizing their government con-
tractual commitments
.
Recommendation—Liquidated damages provisions, placed
in contracts prior to award, provide the procurement manager
with an effective tool that can be used to protect the govern-
ment against failure of a contractor to prosecute the work
diligently to completion. The law does not look vith disfavor
upon liquidated damages provisions. When they are fair and
reasonable attempts to fix just compensation for anticipated
loss, caused by breach of contract, they are enforced.
9. Conclusion—There is a lack of communication and
understanding between SPCC contract administrators and their
DCAS counterparts. This rift degrades the cooperative per-
formance between the two offices, that is necessary, if the
delinquency problem is to be effectively approached.
Recommendation—There must be a continuing, cooperative
relationship between SPCC and DCAS in the pre-award and post-
award administration phases. DCAS must keep the PCO advised
of contract status and potential maj problem areas. Like-
wise, the PCO must keep DCAS advised of all production-related
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matters which emanate from the cognizant material manager.
By communicating and working together, the SPCC contract
administrator and his DCAS counterpart will be able to iden-
tify early warning signs that may point to potential delin-
quency and thus work to prevent the problem before it occurs.
10. Conclusion—The delinquency problem faced by SPCC is
as intangible as it is tangible. There is no single solution
to the problem, in fact, there is likely to be no solution to
it at all. The thoughts, considerations, ideas and recommen-
dations proposed in this research effort are based on a
reasonable yet limited review of the facts. It would be
presumptuous and mistaken to fault, without qualification,
efforts directed (or not directed) at a problem, without
fully understanding the problem itself. This research effort
admits to a knowledge of only the tip of the iceberg.
Recommendation—Those who know the problem best are
those who work with it every day. SPCC should rely on its
own judgment and insight when approaching the delinquency
problem. It should turn to these pages to discover alterna-
tives or "a second opinion". There is room for a great num-
ber of management initiatives on just the tip of the iceberg.
This alone, warrants consideration of the recommendations of
this thesis. The deeper, more fundamental aspects of the
problem, its implications and applicable problem-solving
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SA2301 P65RE1L-CSF DELINQUENCY STATISTICS FOR LRC-VR 82248 Page 473
FSCVj I^ANUFACTURER AND ADDPESS CAO
XXXXX CURB CO 539 00A
415 Sobrel Ave
Girdon PA 21507
EEL pi:en/call CLIN NIIN TOT EXT $ BALANCE DUE
DATE QTY VALUE
78302 N0010478VR352 0005 010658762 17 97.41 17
73332 NOD10478VR352 0003 010629251 4 686.40 4
78332 N0310478VR352 0002 010629250 6 347.58 6
78332 N0010478VR352 0001 010684417 3 568 . 80 3
79017 N0310478VY760 0001 010292247 24 143.76 24
79022 N0010478VBD23 0001AA 003948703 412 3683.28 412
78022 N0010478VBD23 000 1AB 003948703 180 1609.20 180
79046 N0010478VEC14 0001 006539871 17 678.13 17
79069 N0010478VDS59 0001 003701050 5 342.60 5
79073 N0010478VDZ43 0001 005496367 1000 440.00 1000
FSGM TOTAL CONTRACTS/$VALUE CONTRACTS DELINQUENT/$VALUE PERCENT DELINQUENT
5S $524,884.94 10 $8,637.16 16.95
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